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Notes from a Small Place
Anthropological Blues in the Face of Global Terror
by Pnina Werbner
Can there be an engaged public anthropology of global Islamic terror? Arguably, anthropology was
not meant to be a study of clandestine networks or unreachable social groups secretly plotting sudden
cataclysmic international crises. These days, anthropologists study societies in motion and, increas-
ingly, the impact of a global media and global economic events on local communities. In order to
comprehend these, our conceptual tools have had to be stretched beyond their original limits in the
study of small-scale societies. Yet our ethnographic mediations still start from the bottom—from the
small places where we do our ordinary, quotidian research. This includes, as in my own work, the
study of religious mobilization and social movements, radical religious rhetoric, and ontologies of
religious nationalism as they are inflected and moved by mediated global crises. Importantly, also,
anthropologists have studied and continue to study violence: in the face of civil war or the fallout
from global and state terror, they have contributed evocatively to an understanding of the sufferings
and force of memory of ordinary citizens, the victims of such crises, and the activism of human
rights NGOs. But September 11 defied the scale of such events. In this paper I consider the possibilities
for a genuinely anthropological analysis of Islamic militancy in the West following the suicide bomb-
ings of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. As anthropologists we may try, I argue, to
rely on journalistic accounts to supplement our knowledge of small places. After all, journalism too
creates its own ethnographic mediations from the collocation of many small places. But are journalistic
accounts of war zones or clandestine terror reliable? The paper explores some of these issues for
anthropology.
After September 11: Between the
Quotidian and the Global
The destruction of the World Trade Center on September 11,
2001, was a cataclysmic event; it left even hardened journalists
and TV commentators stunned and momentarily speechless.
But within 2 hours the world media had begun to mobilize
its resources not only to describe but to comment on, inter-
pret, and attempt to explain the social dynamics leading up
to September 11. And as events unfolded in Afghanistan in
the following weeks, foreign correspondents were quickly on
the scene, while local commentators, from Pakistani jour-
nalists to political scientists, were soon mobilized for inter-
views and expert opinions and commentaries.
For anthropologists studying Muslim societies in the West,
and even in Afghanistan or Pakistan, the global crisis that
followed September 11 raised serious questions about what
Pnina Werbner is a Professor of Social Anthropology in the School
of Sociology and Criminology at Keele University (Keele, Stafford-
shire ST5 5BG, United Kingdom [p.werbner@keele.ac.uk]). This
paper was submitted 14 II 09 and accepted 22 IV 09.
might constitute specifically anthropological expert knowl-
edge. Anthropologists, after all, tend to do detailed research
over long periods of time in and on very small places. Rarely,
if ever, do they study clandestine terror networks. Even in
those small places where we anthropologists conduct our
fieldwork—an ambiguous activity that we call participant ob-
servation—we mostly encounter the normal and the quotid-
ian, not the extraordinary and world shattering. At most, we
might be able to study the responses of people to such world-
shattering events, their mobilization in defense of what they
perceive to be sacred values or predicaments resulting from
it. Often, we do not even know when we begin our research
where our study will lead us or even how long it will last. So
global crises affecting the people we study in quotidian times
challenge our interpretive capacity as anthropologists. They
are the very opposite of the everyday and the local. Yet it is
precisely our knowledge of the everyday, hidden beneath the
surface, that is presumed by others to be capable of illumi-
nating the secretive and the clandestine. Although I had stud-
ied Pakistanis in the diaspora in Britain and Sufis in the
North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan, what could I say
about September 11 from the vantage point of the small places
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I knew well? This was the beginning and origin of my an-
thropological blues.
My predicament was compounded by the fact that I was
repeatedly invited to speak as an expert on the Muslim di-
aspora, in the unspoken hope that my research might throw
light on British Pakistanis’ involvement in Al-Qaeda terror
networks, despite the fact that to the best of my knowledge,
in all my research on Muslims groups, from Sufi peace lovers
to religious hard-liners and populist fundamentalists, I had
never encountered a Pakistani terrorist, young or old.
My hesitations about the limits of public anthropological
knowledge on 9/11 seemed on the surface to go against the
trend calling on anthropologists to be “engaged”—to “speak
out” on public matters of war and conflict (Gonza´lez 2004)
to counter the “retreat in anthropology from a challenging
and critical role that had become one of its most important
stocks in trade,” linked to the broader “decline of the liberal
institution of the University” (Kapferer 2002:148).
Indeed, many anthropologists have felt compelled to re-
spond to September 11 in a whole series of forums and col-
lections.1 As anthropologists, their opinions were implicitly
authorized by the anthropological aura of insider knowledge.
But were they writing as anthropologists? Some were un-
doubtedly expressing their opinions as public intellectuals
who felt the need to comment on global policies as citizens
of the world. Others responded as citizen-scholars of their
nations to what they regarded as misguided or illegal policies.
Both categories relied heavily in their commentaries on the
immediately available global media and national press for
basic facts. Closer to a full grasp of the events were anthro-
pologists who, though away from the field, were regional ex-
perts on the history, politics, and social demography of the
Middle East, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. These anthropologists
drew on scholarly research and a local press in addition to
the international press and media. Even more persuasive and
well informed were indigenous citizen-scholar experts, in-
cluding those teaching in non-Western universities and mem-
bers of minorities within the West. These experts had con-
tinuous and intimate knowledge of affected populations and
their vernacular press and media.
Anthropologists may choose to speak out eloquently and
persuasively on global terror as public intellectuals or citizen-
1. See contributions to the Social Analysis forum The World Trade
Center and Global Crisis (Kapferer 2002b), which were outstanding both
in terms of the fine quality of intellectual reflections by contributors and
almost invariably their secondhand, tangential, or nonexistent expert
“anthropological” knowledge about the event itself. See also the American
Anthropologist forum In Focus: September 11, 2001 (Mascia-Lees and Lees
2002), which drew on Middle Eastern and Muslim society regional ex-
perts, most of whom expressed the angst and hesitations that 9/11 had
generated for anthropologists of Muslim society (see in particular Abu-
Lughod 2002). There were many other collections and Web sites also
published in 2002, such as the volumes edited by Calhoun et al. (2002)
and Hershberg and Moore (2002), extracted from the Social Science
Research Council Web site After September 11: http://www.ssrc.org/
sept11/.
scholars, even without regional expertise, but the question is,
what particular anthropological theoretical or analytical in-
sights can they bring to bear on an event produced by a hidden
world of clandestine plotting and scheming beyond their
knowledge? And in what sense have their commentaries added
specifically anthropological insight to those of other public
affair analysts? When it comes to the study of shadowy groups
like Al-Qaeda and their allegedly unholy alliances with the
intelligence communities of several countries, there were no
public anthropologists who could speak from a position of
authority based on immediate fieldwork at the time of the
crisis. The hidden world of international intrigue that led
ultimately to the collapse of the Twin Towers on 9/11, has
meant that even an intimate anthropological understanding
of past conflicts and civil war in one place (e.g., in Northern
Ireland or Sri Lanka) does not make anthropologists experts
on violence and conflict on a quite different scale elsewhere.
Closer to home, I propose that the study of everyday Muslim
politics, including the study of Islamic movements and po-
litical mobilization in the name of Islam, does not in itself
equip anthropologists to make sense of the rise of clandestine,
seditious terror plotting even in the same society.2
Before September 11: Studying the Local
in Britain
An example from my own fieldwork in Britain and Pakistan
illustrates the dilemmas of extrapolating from the quotidian
to the cataclysmic. The suicide airplane bombing of the Twin
Towers appeared to be the work of “foreigners,” though some
had been students at European universities. They were not
children of the diaspora, born in the United States or Britain.
It was not long, however, before it emerged that a small but
significant number of British diaspora Pakistanis were also
members of clandestine Islamic militant networks. These
spanned Britain and Pakistan and sometimes Afghanistan and
the Middle East. But such secretive networks in Britain, even
if they existed before September 11, were beyond the reach
of anthropologists. My fieldwork on the Muslim diaspora in
South Manchester, a small community of some 10,000 mostly
Punjabi Muslims from Pakistan, aimed to understand the
evolution of their diasporic public sphere (Werbner 2002a),
a space in which representatives of different Islamic and sec-
ular movements along with aspiring community politicians
formulated fables of diaspora from different perspectives and
in which transnational political imaginaries were interpreted
and argued over and political mobilization generated. In-
2. Kapferer (1988) argues perceptively for the leakage between every-
day exorcism rituals and anti-Tamil Sinhala ideologies. While recognizing
that “terror” is a disputed term, I use it here for want of a better term,
to refer to nonstate militant actors who deliberately target civilian pop-
ulations violently in order to cause fear and mayhem and disrupt the
usual assumptions about personal safety. This is not to deny the possibility
of state terror or of some terrorists defining themselves or being redefined
as liberation or freedom fighters.
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creasingly during the 1990s, following the Satanic Verses affair
in Britain and the first Gulf War, this local diasporic public
sphere became a space where nation, citizenship, Islam, and
international conflicts were intertwined in the rhetoric of local
leaders. While culturally part of a wider South Asian diaspora
and usually identified in Britain as “South Asians,” British
Pakistani migrant-settlers now defined (or redefined) them-
selves as a Muslim diaspora. They constructed the world as
a network of Muslim communities and positioned themselves
as an affluent, privileged community centrally located within
that network.
The diasporic public sphere was a local arena of political,
factional, and Islamic sectarian conflict, argument, and imag-
inative creativity. It was hidden and thus invisible, before it
unexpectedly emerged to national visibility during the Satanic
Verses controversy in 1990. That affair, focused on an allegedly
blasphemous postcolonial novel by Salman Rushdie, revealed
for the first time the passionate intensity with which diaspora
British Muslims were willing to defend the honor of Islam
and the Prophet and their public mobilization as a united
front, transcending their internal divisions. Like September
11, the Rushdie affair, following the Ayatollah Komeini death
fatwa and the author’s retreat into hiding, became a global
event that raised questions about multicultural citizenship and
the rule of law. In different parts of the world, rioters were
killed and translators assassinated. Its magnification as a global
event, the focus of intense media attention and countermo-
bilization by prominent writers, politicians, ethnic represen-
tatives, and public figures, marginalized the significance of
anthropological insights into the matter.
Hence even before September 11, documenting the coex-
istence of a multiplicity of public discourses in a single di-
aspora still begged a critical question: why focus on obscure,
localized disputes and arcane arguments of identity in hidden
arenas in Manchester when at stake are global issues of post-
colonial migration, racism, and religious nationalism? Why
study the local, even in its response to globally mediated
events, when the discourses enunciated are pervasively global
and versions of them are publicized and debated by both
English and Urdu media? Indeed, why study “the local” at
all? This, of course, is an issue of some consequence for an-
thropology and subaltern studies more generally. One key
message of my research in Manchester was to recognize the
intellectual and aesthetic work performed by a buried Muslim
diasporic intelligentsia, organic intellectuals operating beyond
the objectifying gaze of social scientists and journalists alike
and belying simplistic profiles of Muslim underprivilege. But,
perhaps more significantly for the events following September
11, I found that in their political discourses on world events,
British Pakistani orators often agreed with one another across
religious sectarian divisions: they enunciated a pervasive dis-
course of Muslim failure and abjection that demonized the
Judeo-Christian West while at the same time enunciating mil-
lennial hopes for Muslim ascendancy. This was true even of
those speakers of the majority Barelvi Sunni tendency, who
certainly did not envisage taking the law into their own
hands.3
After September 11: An Engaged
Anthropology of Terror
Notwithstanding the forgoing comments, my initial inability
to make definitive statements as an expert on the Muslim
diaspora and its response to September 11 calls for expla-
nation. As I watched the collapse of the Twin Towers, I won-
dered what I, as an anthropologist, could say about the events
unfolding before my eyes—and the inevitable repercussions
that would follow. Did the fact that I had studied Pakistanis’
responses to previous crises make me a prophet or an expert
on the current one? After all, like the Greek philosopher Her-
aclitus, Pakistanis in Manchester might have remained in the
same river yet different waters were flowing through it now.
What right did I have to assume that the river was still the
same river? How does an engaged anthropologist respond to
violent global crises without resorting either to essentialist
notions of culture or to becoming yet another current affairs
analyst, reliant on the public media for her expert knowledge?
Answering my question calls for a theoretically informed
perspective on recent anthropological studies that have sought
to analyze societies in flux and to understand rupture and
violence at a national scale without abandoning the notion
of culture and society altogether. Before considering anthro-
pological insights into Islamic radicalization and militancy, I
want to reflect first on the strengths of engaged anthropol-
ogists in their study of national crises that, like the Rushdie
affair or 9/11, have also been the subject of intense media
focus. Ethnic and religious conflicts and civil wars in Sri
Lanka, Northern Ireland, Burundi, Zimbabwe, Columbia, and
India, among others, have created a powerful literature of the
everyday experiences and suffering of victims of civil wars
and state terror and the embedded myths-cum-ideologies
used by perpetrators of violence.4 There are several strands
in this anthropological oeuvre. A dominant strand concerns
the memory of violence and the politics of memory. This
“testimonial” literature records the voices of victims who have
suffered terrible atrocities; it constitutes a major contribution
to a human rights discourse demanding moral accountability
for disappearances and massacres (e.g., Arditti 1999; Chatterji
and Mehta 2007; Das 1990; Schirmer 1993; Werbner 1991,
1995). In many instances victims have asked the anthro-
3. On this, see P. Werbner (2004). Barelvi followers endorse saintly
veneration within a Sufi tradition that is normally nonviolent.
4. It would be impossible to list all the studies of victims of human
rights atrocities. On Zimbabwe see, e.g., Lan (1985) and Werbner (1991);
on Sri Lanka see Kapferer (1988), Spencer (1990, 2000), Tambiah (1986,
1992), and Valentine (1996); on perpetrators/victims of violence in Bu-
rundi see Malkki (1995); on Northern Ireland see, e.g., Aretxaga (1997),
Feldman (1991), and Jarman (1997); on Columbia see Tate (2007) and
Taussig (1999, 2003); and on communal riots in India see Chatterji and
Mehta (2007) and Das (1990).
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pologist to record their narratives for posterity, to give public
voice to the cruelty inflicted upon them by the state. Such
painful recollections have enabled these anthropologists to
theorize the roots of ethnic, communal, and religious
violence.
A second anthropological strand has considered the myths
and ideologies of the perpetrators of violence (Kapferer 1988;
Malkki 1995; Tambiah 1992).5 Within this strand, the voices
and phenomenology of embodied strategies of imprisoned
members of underground movements give some insight into
the motives of those who perpetrate terror (Aretxaga 1997;
Feldman 1991; Khosrokhavar 2006).6 A third strand in this
anthropology of terror is that of “witness” accounts in war
zones (e.g., Nordstrom 1997; Taussig 2003). Such accounts
show how civilians, caught between murderous and even gen-
ocidal armed actors, try to make sense of the deaths and
disappearances around them and suffer the terrible conse-
quences of displacement. Sometimes the anthropologist’s
voice has been the only one documenting such events for a
wider audience. The fourth strand in this growing literature
of engaged anthropology is the study of truth commissions
and human rights organizations as they seek restitution for
victims (Tate 2007; Wilson 2001).7
These studies highlight the unique capacity of anthropol-
ogists to comment on the aftermath and consequences of
terror through intimate ethnography. As regional experts with
firsthand fieldwork, they can also map out key terms and
actors that make possible an analysis of evolving processes in
zones of conflict. The question is, can the same be said of
anthropological studies of Islamic radicalization, militancy,
jihadism, martyrdom, and violent activism? Reviewing some
of the anthropological responses to 9/11, written from the
point of view of regional experts, I believe that the contours
of an implicit anthropological theory of jihadism may be
discerned. Whether it can explain geopolitical confrontations
such as 9/11 remains questionable, however.
Seen together, the studies point to key features of global
jihadism. Ideologically, it is: (a) millennial; (b) Manichean;
(c) altruistic; and (d) characterized by infinitely nuanced scho-
lastic distinctions in militant groups’ rules, regulations, and
attitudes to gender, violence, and the state. These define their
boundaries. On this latter feature, Hefner’s study of radical
Islamic movements in democratizing Indonesia, for example,
highlights the nuances of radicalism and pluralism in these
movements, as does his insight that radical Muslims in In-
donesia differed from Al-Qaeda in their support rather than
opposition to the Saudi regime (Hefner 2002:762). So too,
5. For Tambiah’s debate with Kapferer, see Tambiah (1992:170–181).
6. Khosrokhavar interviewed Islamist jihadists in French jails. See also
Rosenthal (2006). In Britain the law forbids criminals to profit from
crime. Most prominent jihadists wait to be released before selling their
stories. It is unclear whether they would be willing to be interviewed or
whether this would be allowed by authorities at present.
7. Wilson (2005) has also edited a book on the human rights impli-
cations of the war on terror.
Muhammad Zaman, an orientalist, moving beyond Metcalf
(2002), shows the subtle shades of Deobandi political thought
and mobilization in Pakistan. While recognizing the central
role of the Deobandi in creating the Taliban and threatening
to “Talibanize” Pakistan, Zaman points to differences between
some ulama in the Karachi Deobandi seminary and the hard-
liner Taliban ulama; the former appeared to have “broader
horizons” (Zaman 2002:140) and even urged the hard-liners
to follow “the path of culture and civilisation” (Zaman 2002:
139).
The Manichean worldview of Islamists has been highlighted
by anthropologists who have analyzed the historic resentment
and negative constructions of the West and the United States
in Iran (Beeman 1983) and more recently in the Middle East
and Pakistan. A salient further distinction characterizing Is-
lamist rhetoric is between “millennial” discourses that invoke
a utopian kingdom on earth and a return to the pristine time
of the Prophet, on the one hand, and on the other, “jihadist”
discourses that promote martyrdom as the gateway to para-
dise, the kingdom of heaven (P. Werbner 2004). Jihadists often
live in a world where dreams of paradise seem more real that
the mundane reality around them (Edgar 2004). Further im-
portant ideological distinctions are between those aiming to
install an Islamic state through the ballot box (as in the case
of Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan); jihadists, who espouse the
violent overthrow of Muslim and other regimes (as in the
case of Hizb-ut-Tahrir or Al Muhajairun); neofundamental-
ists, who seek to “purify” and reform the person as a pre-
condition to the ideal Islamic state, whether peacefully (as in
the case of Tabligh-i-Islam) or violently (as in the case of the
Taliban); and those who espouse martyrdom, the fight to
the death against so-called infidels (as in the case of Al-
Qaeda). Among these, so-called young takfiri (rejectionist)
groups who espouse violence and regard most other Mus-
lims as apostates, have been found to be composed of clus-
ters of friends, affines, and close relatives, many of whom
grew up or played soccer together (Atran 2008; Sageman
2008:39, 66–69, 140–143).
Gender is also a key source of distinctiveness, including
questions of whether women are entitled to vote or be voted
into Parliament, as in Iran; whether they are violently pro-
hibited from education, as enforced by the Taliban; and
whether they should wear a scarf or a full niqab (full face
covering). Anthropologists as regional experts have consid-
ered why contemporary Islamist women veil and ritualize
their lives to the point where the sacred is understood to
envelope the profane entirely, as in the subtle analysis of pietist
women in Egypt (Mahmood 2005). Several have written on
the European response to diasporic Muslim veiling and how
this relates to notions of shame, and to honor killings.8 At
some moments in history, as Fischer shows in his analysis of
the events of the Iranian revolution, a swirl of competing
8. On France, see Bowen (2007); on Britain, Werbner (2007b); on
Germany, Ewing (2008); and on Norway, Wikan (2008).
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ideologies can coexist, some authoritarian, others socialist or
even liberal, before one triumphs (Fischer 1980, chap. 6, pp.
181–231; see also Fischer and Abedi 1990).9
The reach of institutionalized politicized Islamic organi-
zations may be vast. Research by historians, orientalists, and
journalists in Pakistan has recorded the enormous prolifer-
ation of Deobandi madrasas (Malik 1998; Zaman 2002) along-
side the politicization of a significant Deobandi Islamic school
of thought focused on the Dar al-Ulum Haqqaniyya seminary
near Peshawar and the Jamiat al-Ulum al Islamiyya seminary
in Karachi. Both these religious seminaries became huge re-
cruiters to the Taliban and international terror networks
(Hussain 2007:135–143).
The ideological divisions of Islamists and jihadists have led
organizationally to an efflorescence of militant groups whose
networks often extend globally (Abou Zahab and Roy 2004).
At their core are often cadres of dedicated members focused
on a charismatic leader. Iain Edgar has analyzed jihadist
dreams, including those by Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders, and
found that dreams both motivate conversion to jihadism and
are regarded as divinatory predictions and prescriptions of
future events and actions, especially when the dreamers are
divinely inspired charismatic leaders (Edgar 2004, 2006, 2007,
2008). I have argued, in response to Peter van der Veer’s view
(2004) that charisma had ceased to be a useful concept in the
modern world, that
Against the skeptical view of charisma as irrelevant to post-
colonial or globalization theory, one may argue that trans-
national communication has enhanced the status of religious
charismatic figures and their organizational reach. Osama
bin Laden, one such figure, constructed his persona in the
classic image of a Sufi world renouncer; a man who had
abandoned his wealth to live in the desert for the sake of
Islam. (Werbner 2003:283; see also Devji 2005:42–44)
Seen together, the key organizational features of organized
jihadist movements can be summed up as (1) multiplicity,
(2) cadre-type structure with elite members and a wide fan
of sympathizers, (3) charismatic leadership, and (4) global
connections and international movement of members (to
study in the Middle East or to jihadist camps in Pakistan
and Afghanistan). A further key feature is (5) media and
publicity hunger. Even Al-Qaeda, despite its clandestine ac-
tivities, has sought interviews with journalists and media
exposure through its video recordings. Quintan Wiktorow-
itcz, a political scientist who studied the radical jihadist
group Al-Muhajiroun in Britain (Wictorowitcz 2005:
150–160), stresses this feature.10 Suicide bombers aspire to
be viewed as heroes (Sageman 2008:158). Finally, (6) mar-
9. See, e.g., my own interpretation (Werbner 1996, 2002a).
10. Wictorowitcz conducted fieldwork over three separate months in
2002, supplemented by interviews and documentary research over a
longer period. Although members of the movment were apparently in-
volved in seditious plots, he appears to be unaware of this.
tyrdom movements are altruistic, espousing the ultimate
self-sacrifice (Asad 2007).
Despite the violent tendencies of some Islamist movements,
most anthropologists have stressed the subjective, nonviolent
dimensions of the Islamic movements they study (e.g., White
2002). Much more than studying global Islamic extremism
and violent militancy against the West, anthropologists have
been prominent in trying to explode essentialized stereotypes
of all Muslims as terrorists.
Such anthropological insights, significant in scholarly re-
gional and anthropological debates, are hardly satisfactory for
those who believe that anthropologists as “embedded” eth-
nographers hold the magic bullet for the “why” of Islamic
terror following 9/11.11 Lila Abu-Lughod reports being “del-
uged with invitations to speak” after 9/11, and she asks herself,
“Why did this not please me?” (Abu-Lughod 2002:783). Such
invitations put anthropologists in a false position. Being there
does not in itself give them a privileged handle on current
affairs, clandestine terror networks, or cataclysmic events, and
this is particularly so in our information-rich, media-saturated
society. Being there certainly gave me, I felt, very limited
competence to comment on underground Islamic militancy
in the Muslim diaspora from the perspective of an expert.
Anthropologists like myself had studied ongoing familial or
religious transnational networks linking British Pakistanis in
the diaspora with their homeland. There were no anthro-
pological studies of young British Pakistanis’ secret visits to
jihadist camps in Pakistan, a transnational movement linked
after 9/11 to the rise of diasporic Pakistani militancy and
suicide bombing in Britain.
The basic question remains: what can anthropologists con-
tribute to the public understanding of Pakistani jihadism tar-
geting Western nations? Can anthropologists go beyond the
well-known insight that British Pakistanis are politically angry
at the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan and the continued
plight and sufferings of Iraqis, Afghans, and Palestinians? Al-
most universally, Pakistanis doubt that it was Muslims who
bombed the World Trade Center. The official report to the
House of Commons on the July 7, 2005, London under-
ground bombings drew on one of the suicide bombers’ vi-
deos to argue that a dominant motivation for the bombers
was “the perceived injustices carried out by the West against
Muslims” (HM Government 2006:19). Such conclusions by
the commission did not rely on anthropological knowledge,
and this is true of most of the interpretations of Islamic
militancy, since the discourse is widely available on jihadist
Web sites.
11. In her study of human rights organizations in Columbia, Winifred
Tate calls herself an “embedded ethnographer” (Tate 2007:13, 23) in a
deliberately provocative sense, to underline the partial nature of any
account. Like her, I use the term somewhat ironically, in the light of
recent debates about anthropologists as embedded ethnographers in the
American military in Iraq and Afghanistan (see n. 7).
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Conspiracies and International Political
Intrigue
If many of the features of militant Islam were known before
September 11, what evidently changed was the globalization
of militant networks and their spread into Muslim countries
beyond the Middle East and into the Muslim diaspora in the
West. In 2001, in the public domain outside the intelligence
world, little was known about Al-Qaeda beyond the bare facts
of Bin Laden’s career (Beeman 2004 [2001]; Scheer 2002).12
The mobilization of young Saudis for a transnational jihadist
movement supported by large-scale Saudi funding, their sub-
sequent inglorious return home at the end of the first Afghan
war, and their suppression by the Saudi state are analyzed by
anthropologist Madawi Al-Rasheed on the basis of a range of
indigenous sources in Arabic, including speeches by Saudi
Islamists. Al-Rasheed (2007:106 passim) stresses the trans-
formation undergone by these young “Saudi Afghan” fighters,
redefined as dangerous insiders, in the evolution of Al-Qaeda.
Others have argued, less subtly, that the rupture with the Saudi
regime arose in response to Saudi hosting of U.S. troops
during the first Gulf War and its aftermath (Ahmed 2005:12).
At this point one enters the murky waters of intelligence
services, undercover alliances, conspiracies, and countercon-
spiracies. Based on recent fieldwork among the Tuareg, an-
thropologist Jeremy Keenan has argued that they were falsely
constructed as members of Al-Qaeda by the Algerian state,
part of a deal with the United States to expand into the Sahara
in the global war on terror (GWOT). Based on interviews
and observations in the field, Keenan’s analysis reveals a world
of political intrigue (Keenan 2006, 2009, forthcoming).
Far more fantastical are allegations by informed regional
experts, basing their arguments primarily on journalistic in-
terviews and intelligence reports, that for the sake of oil, the
Taliban and Al-Qaeda were supported by a secret alliance of
the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan from 1991 al-
most until September 2001, in an operation conducted
through periodic secret meetings (Ahmed 2005:14–24,
26–28). The same sources claim that, having backed radical
Islamic mujahideen groups in the Afghan war against the So-
viet invasion, the United States, in alliance with Turkey, Saudi
Arabia, and Iran, assisted the recruitment of thousands of
young Islamist militants to fight against the Serbs in Bosnia,
thus effectively globalizing the jihadist movement (Ahmed
2005:32–33). Among those recruited were scores of Al-Qaeda
members (cited in Ahmed 2005:34). Osama bin Laden himself
was said in a Republican Congressional Report in 1997 “to
bankroll numerous militant groups” (Ahmed 2005:34). The
United States’ alleged support for bin Laden continued despite
the fact that he had “publicly declared war against the USA
12. William Beeman, an anthropologist who is an Iran and Middle
East expert, writes a blog titled Culture and International Affairs, on
Iranian-American relations and current affairs in the Middle East and
South Asia, http://www.wbeeman.com/.
in 1996” while in the Sudan (Ahmed 2005:21) and that after
1998, when he moved to Afghanistan, the Taliban’s anti-
American and anti-Saudi worldview became increasingly stri-
dent (Ahmed 2005:24). In an about-turn in mid-July 2001,
in secret alliance with Russia and India (Ahmed 2005:25),
America was said to have warned the Taliban through an
intermediary of her intention to bomb Afghanistan and topple
the regime (Ahmed 2005:29). It was a “game plan” intended
“to remove al-Qaida from the face of the earth” (Ahmed 2005:
30). If any of this is to be believed, that threat in itself would
have prompted a preemptive strike by Al-Qaeda on the World
Trade Center 2 months later! Other accounts in this con-
spiracy genre allege that Islamist plots in the West were in-
stigated by agent provocateurs; that self-proclaimed militants
such as the “Blind Sheikh,” who masterminded the 1993
World Trade Center attack, were in the pay of the CIA. Despite
the claimed wealth of evidence presented by Ahmed, most
research in the Middle East or South Asia neither anticipated
nor was able to explain fully the events leading to the cata-
clysmic global crisis of September 11 and its aftermath.
“Public” Anthropology and the Question
of Anthropological “Relevance”
The internationalization of Islamic militancy raises several
related questions that anthropologists have agonized over fol-
lowing 9/11 and its aftermath: first, can there be a “public,”
“engaged” anthropology; second, is anthropology “relevant”;
and finally, is an “anthropology of international relations”
possible (Thomas 2001:7)? Such questions have come to be
particularly pressing for anthropologists studying Muslims in
widely separated localities, from Pakistan, Afghanistan, the
Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia to their evermore
widespread diasporas in Europe, North America, and Aus-
tralia. There is an ethical dimension to this dilemma—how
closely should we attempt to influence the centers of power
and policy making? How will our pronouncements affect the
people we study as well as professional colleagues? There are
countries such as Norway in which anthropologists regularly
comment in the press on current affairs involving minorities,
however tangential to their fieldwork.13 In the English-speak-
ing West, however, as Ahmed and Shore remark somewhat
despairingly, “a good journalist could produce what anthro-
pologists produce, only more cheaply, better and faster—and
in a format calculated to reach a far wider audience” (Ahmed
and Shore 1995:23).
The call for a kind of popular anthropology, accessible to
the masses, is, however, not my concern here. Public anthro-
pology, as I read it, is a more serious scholarly engagement
with public affairs from the informed standpoint of a field-
worker. But it is true, nevertheless, that such engagements
13. See Eriksen (2005) on this tendency in Norway. In Israel, Dan
Rabinowitz, Smadar Lavie, and Esther Hertzog contribute regularly to
the press.
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often take place, at least in the United Kingdom and the
United States, in a crowded field of expert current affairs
analysts and indigenous public intellectuals, including jour-
nalists and TV reporters. These may, indeed, be better placed
professionally or ethically to analyze local/global crises.14
The brave aspirations of public anthropology are summed
up in an introduction to a special issue of Current Anthro-
pology, Going Public with Anthropology, in which Robin G.
Fox (Fox 1996:nil5) reminds us that Sol Tax (founding editor
of Current Anthropology) “practiced an anthropology based
on civic responsibility, public participation, and radical hu-
manist principles,” that anthropology “from its professional
start aimed to play a significant role in civil society—as a
means of education, social reform, policy making and edu-
cational debate on public issues.” Similarly, Jeremy Mac-
Clancy’s edited collection, Exotic No More (MacClancy 2002),
aims to show the “large contribution” that anthropologists
can make to a wide range of practical social issues, drawing
on the strengths of anthropological fieldwork, while recog-
nizing the effects of globalization and the need sometimes to
“study up.” Ulf Hannerz, reflecting on the possible anthro-
pological contribution to major debates on world transfor-
mations, suggests that perhaps “anthropologists can enter the
public culture” by giving a “human face—better yet, a number
of different faces, and voices—to large scale, too easily anon-
ymous processes and offer an understanding of what human
agency has to do with them” (Hannerz 2004:231). The new
University of California Press Series in Public Anthropology
aims to continue “anthropology’s commitment to being an
ethnographic witness . . . but also adds a commitment,
through ethnography, to reframing the terms of public de-
bate—transforming received, accepted understandings of so-
cial issues.”15
There is no doubt that in some developing countries in the
South the anthropological voice can and does reach beyond
authoritarian official discourses or can add authoritative le-
gitimacy to local activists’ social and political mobilization.
In civil war–torn Mozambique, in Zimbabwe under Ian
Smith’s and Robert Mugabe’s regimes, in Argentina and Co-
lumbia in the face of disappearances or mass violence, in Sri
Lanka and Burundi during the civil wars there, anthropolo-
gists have aimed to describe, explain, and understand terror
and its consequences.16 But critical public anthropology, as
Richard Werbner argues, is beset with, on the one hand, the
14. Joining this crowd in 2006, 5 years after the bombing of the Twin
Towers, Akbar Ahmed, ex-Pakistani civil servant, anthropologist of tribal
society, Western academic, and Renaissance man of Urdu literature, po-
etry, and history, embarked on an “anthropological excursion” through-
out the Muslim world, meeting young students and prominent political
leaders; a personal journey in which he reflects on global geopolitics and
their implications for Muslims after 9/11 (Ahmed 2007). His research
methods for this particular project were, however, more journalistic than
anthropological.
15. Taken from the final pages of Tate (2007) in that series, which is
edited by Robert Borowsky.
16. See references above, n. 4.
“hazards of disengagement” arising from the local specificity
of fieldwork and, on the other hand, the “hazard” of “dis-
solving into other disciplinary subjects, perhaps better
equipped to navigate the flood of media representations” (R.
Werbner 2004:4, 5). My point is not to dismiss public an-
thropology—and I say more about my own engagement be-
low—but to demand a better appreciation of its heightened
predicament in the face of current pressure for extraordinary
expertise.
After September 11: The Anthropologist
as Public Expert
In the current charged field of hidden conspiracies, anthro-
pologists such as myself easily acquire the aura of experts who
understand the below-the-surface motivations and passions
of apparently ordinary young people. It is not a matter of
seeking a “voice” for anthropology. In the period directly fol-
lowing September 11, policy makers and the media were all
too eager to tap this hidden and seemingly powerful anthro-
pological knowledge. Admittedly, in the United Kingdom the
“authentic” voice of Pakistani academics commanded most
respect, while political scientists were the ones who most often
tended to venture into the media with their scholarly
opinions.
Over the years I (like many of my colleagues) became,
almost despite myself, a reluctant public anthropologist. I had
to respond to national and global events impacting the people
I studied: the Satanic Verses affair (Werbner 1996, 2002a), the
first Gulf War (Werbner 1994), protests against the murder
and rape of innocents in Bosnia (Werbner 2002a), September
11 and the second Gulf War (P. Werbner 2004), riots in Old-
ham and other northern cities (Werbner 2005b), Islamopho-
bia (Werbner 2005a), the headscarf affair (2007b), and the
Danish cartoon affair (Der Spiegel Online International 2006).
Most recently, I analyzed a public discourse in the media
invoking “seditious” spaces and organizations that developed
in Britain following the July 7, 2005, London underground
bombing (2009). During several of these crises I was indeed
an “embedded ethnographer” in the sense that I was doing
fieldwork: in 1989–1991, at the time of the Rushdie affair and
the first Gulf War, in 1995 during the Bosnian crisis, and in
2000, just before 9/11. Each time my reluctance to venture
into the realm of public affairs arose from the view that while
such crises may seem to expose “a limited area of transparency
on the otherwise opaque surface of regular, uneventful social
life,” as Victor Turner (1957:93) poetically commented, in
reality, the ordinary cannot explain the extraordinary! If field-
work taught me one thing, it is that there is no essential clash
of civilizations between the Muslim world and the West, de-
spite global crises like September 11 and despite attempts by
extremists on both sides to construct an epic conflict in these
terms. Instead, extraordinary global crises make it impossible
to go back to business as usual. More often, as in the case of
diaspora Muslims, extraordinary global crises cause spiraling
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alienation and marginality in a transnational community
holding deeply felt anti- or postcolonial convictions arising
from an historically embedded diasporic sensibility.
The Rushdie affair and the civil war in Bosnia had taught
me that despite Pakistanis in Britain being defined as an un-
derprivileged minority, they saw themselves as a privileged
group, located at the hub of world politics and hence re-
sponsible to protest against the injustices and sufferings of
Muslims elsewhere. What I could not—and perhaps did not
want to—know was that a minority of young Pakistanis had
been for some time, even before 9/11, involved in serious
illegal activities. These have come to light since 2007, during
court trials of conspiring suicide bombers, which revealed that
many members of the most radical young Islamist groups in
Britain had trained in so-called jihadist camps in Pakistan.
Such revelations of clandestine transnational networks merely
underlined my inability to fully comprehend or “explain” the
community I had studied in the present heated-up atmo-
sphere. A wide range of locations—mosques, internet clubs,
Islamic bookshops, schools and even youth camps in the Lake
District—were disclosed by British intelligence, the police, and
courts to be terrorist “hotspots” (and hence evidently beyond
the bounds for anthropologists).17 It seemed that like Pakistan
itself, Britain too had become a place of “multiple armed and
clandestine actors”; alongside young Muslims, MI5 (the Brit-
ish equivalent of the FBI), Scotland Yard, undercover inves-
tigative journalists, and TV photographers all jostled for a
piece of the action.
Anthropological fieldwork is necessarily based on long-
term relations of trust. This is particularly so when the West
is perceived as the enemy of Islam, in contexts in which
conspiracy theories abound along with suspicion of hidden
motives beneath the surface. These make the anthropologist’s
stated aim to study knowledge for the sake of knowledge
highly suspect. Ulterior motives are invariably presumed by
subjects, and the presumptions are often impossible to fully
dispel. My research on Sufism and a Sufi order in Pakistan
and Britain was seen by some disciples to be motivated by a
hidden desire to convert to Islam and by others as having
more nefarious objectives, perhaps even military spying. I was
a woman, a British Jew, and an Israeli. The living saint at the
centre of the cult I studied was, for his followers, the axis
mundi, a man of infinite spiritual power and hence a security
threat to the enemies of Islam. An important British vice-
regent (deputy) of the shaikh once accosted me and asked,
“Are you studying Islam or something else?” When I replied
that I was studying tasawwuf (Sufism), he responded with
intense anger, “How can you study that without being a Mus-
lim?” (Werbner 2003:300 passim). There were disciples who
trusted and supported me, as did the shaikh and his son,
though now and then they too wavered in response to ma-
licious gossip.
17. I describe these accusations, gathered from the press and media,
in Werbner (2009).
My research in Britain on the diasporic public sphere made
evident that ethnic community leaders prefer to represent
their views to the wider British public themselves; they cer-
tainly do not entrust outsiders with this task. They did not
feel that they needed me, in other words, as an advocate who
could speak on their behalf, and they were concerned that I,
an independent academic beyond their control, might mis-
represent them in print. The burden of representation for
anthropologists is thus a heavy one. It is certainly not our
task to add to the sense of pervasive conspiracy generated by
politicians, public commentators, and journalists. Yet an en-
gaged anthropology cannot be based on fieldwork as usual.
It is naive and self-delusionary to think otherwise. Perhaps
an engaged public anthropology should aim instead to bear
“witness” to the suffering of ordinary people in the face of
extraordinary predicaments?
We need thus to reflect on our main task as anthropologists.
Is it to speak out on “terror,” broadly defined, and attempt
to “explain” its causes and consequences? If so, what might
such explanations consist of? Or is it rather to study the
predicaments of vulnerable minorities suspected or accused
of harboring terrorists. The first option would lead us to
highlight Islamic violent militancy—in Britain the so-called
radicalization or fanaticism that persuades apparently ordi-
nary young British-born Pakistanis to become suicide bomb-
ers. The alternative aim would lead more modestly to a re-
flection on the impact that widespread securitization and wars
in the Middle East and Pakistan have had on local diasporic
lives. But even this modest anthropological objective is fraught
in the post-9/11 era, given a pervasive sense of anxiety, re-
sentment, and suspicion among British Pakistanis, faced with
perceived Western stereotypes, stigmatization, and violent in-
ternational aggression.
The dilemma of how to write about Muslim minorities at
a time of terror without becoming a mere apologist is com-
pounded by the fact that suicide bombings and seditious plots
by a small minority of young, apparently ordinary, British-
born Pakistanis have undermined any illusion of Muslim har-
monious integration into British society. Attempts to profile
this cohort by experts reveal a tendency to strip away the
particular in order to discover the average.18 Reliance on news
vignettes is equally problematic for anthropology: news fea-
tures often lack the veracity, the considered analysis, the rich-
ness and contextual embeddedness of anthropological ac-
counts based on long-term fieldwork.19 Nevertheless, the
18. A recent survey of the press and other sources by a journalist and
expert reporter on Pakistan, Jason Burke (2008), identifies British Muslim
terrorists as on average older than might be expected (29 years old), married
(30%), mostly affluent and educated (many in science, engineering, and
information technology), and with petty criminal records. It seems they
become radicalized very quickly, within a year, and not necessarily by
mosques’ “preachers of hate.” See also Sageman 2008, chap. 3.
19. This view, of the unreliability of much available public information
and academic commentaries on militant networks is supported by the
careful “scientific” or “field-based” research by Sageman (2008:25–28)
and Atran (2008:2).
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“news” as reported by journalists and foreign correspondents
has been the dominant source of information for most public
intellectuals including anthropologists in their commentaries
on 9/11 and its aftermath. It is thus legitimate to ask, in what
respects do anthropologists resemble or differ from journal-
ists, and particularly foreign correspondents?
“Being There”: Anthropologists versus
Journalists
In a series of publications, Ulf Hannerz (1996, 2004) contrasts
anthropologists with foreign correspondents. Anthropolo-
gists, he says, tend to study the long or medium dure´e, the
relatively unchanging, while foreign correspondents study the
present moment of crisis. Anthropologists usually choose
places to study where other anthropologists have never set
foot; they appropriate a field as theirs. Foreign correspondents
converge on a trouble spot, swap information while com-
peting for scoops, hang out at the same bars and are taken
on the same guided tours of war zones. Anthropologists tend
to study over their lifetime career at most two or three dif-
ferent, culturally distinct “societies” or localities, even if we
return repeatedly to our sites of fieldwork. Foreign corre-
spondents easily accumulate portfolios of a dozen or more
crisis spots all over the world. Sometimes they stay in one
place for several years, longer than most anthropologists, de-
veloping regional expertise and local contacts. At other times
they flit in and out of a place in short sorties. Nevertheless,
however brief their stay, they maintain the authoritative fac¸ade
of experts. The contrast is one that reaches to the heart of
representations of culture. Whereas anthropologists tend to
stress cultural difference and transformation within a broader
humanistic framework, journalists either ignore cultural dif-
ference altogether—people are victims of earthquakes, bomb-
ings, repression or terror in a panhuman sense, immediately
communicable—or they tend to dehumanize the “Other” al-
together by stressing uncompromising cultural difference, as
in the case of representations of the Taliban or Al-Qaeda.
At first glance, a key difference between foreign corre-
spondents and anthropologists lies in their modes of data
collection. Journalists gather most of their information via a
media industry—press releases, government guided tours,
translations from the local press, and assistance from local,
indigenous journalists. At their best, anthropologists gather
their data through observation, piecemeal, from many infor-
mants, “in particles,” as Evans-Pritchard described his field-
work among the Nuer.
But there are also similarities in the collection of data. In
Evelyn Waugh’s satirical novel on foreign correspondents,
Scoop, the intrepid foreign journalist who is sent by mistake
to Africa uncovers his scoop indirectly from a hairdresser who
happens to also work at the palace. While other foreign cor-
respondents are driven off into the desert, far away from a
brewing palace coup, our reluctant foreign correspondent
scoops the big story by staying put, isolated from the crowd.
As for journalists, so too for anthropologists—informants
come in all shapes and guises. Hannerz records that major
TV networks and newspapers run well-oiled foreign media
machineries, combining indigenous journalists and foreign-
ers, stringers, handlers, translators, secretaries, and photog-
raphers. Yet equally, a great deal can be learned free of charge
through casual conversations with local taxi drivers, hotel
porters, and shopkeepers.
Like journalists, anthropologists too have their loquacious
informants, more insightful, reflective, and willing to share
their thoughts than others in the field. Clifford Geertz has
argued that contemporary anthropologists are no longer able
to do their research in glorious isolation. They must work
alongside historians, sociologists, political scientists, and de-
mographers, as well as writers and poets commenting on their
own society. As Geertz says,
Walking barefoot through the whole of culture is really no
longer an option, and the anthropologist who tries it is in
grave danger of being descended upon in print by an out-
raged textualist or a maddened demographer. (Geertz 1985:
623)
Although we may study a very restricted local scene or per-
sonal network, this local scene is invariably penetrated these
days by global images, economic interests, and political events
elsewhere. To comprehend the local, then, we anthropologists,
like the people whom we study, must become amateur experts
on world affairs.
Why, then, my anthropological blues in the face of global
terror? Part of this has been the simple fact that it is difficult,
if not impossible, to conduct genuine fieldwork based on trust
among British Muslims at a time of intense suspicion and
alienation and increasingly pervasive intelligence surveillance,
although one can certainly sustain friendships that have
reached a point where they transcend the political. I have had
a few such friends in Manchester with whom I can talk freely
about September 11, knowing they will share with me their
innermost thoughts, however unacceptable to English society.
But to gauge the full impact of the Muslim diasporic response
to September 11 and its aftermath, I have often had to rely
on the virtual cascade of information coming from radio, the
press, and television, including the Asian and Muslim ethnic
press published in the United Kingdom.20
During the Afghan war, 3,000 foreign correspondents were
said to have descended on Islamabad and later Kabul (Han-
nerz 2004:44). In Britain, it seemed that at least as many
journalists descended on Muslim inner city areas, interviewing
the young and the old, male and female, secular Muslim
women in jeans and pious Muslim women in scarves and
niqabs. One radio news channel, Radio 5 Live, ran a 2-hour
daily phone-in debating the crisis: Why do British Muslims
support the Taliban? Has Osama bin Laden’s guilt been
20. This includes, among others, Muslim Weekly, Q News, Eastern Eye,
and various magazines and Web sites.
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proven? How much guilt does America bear for the current
crisis? Are British Muslims who went to fight in Afghanistan
to be regarded as traitors? What does loyalty to Britain mean?
In the first weeks after 9/11, daily news bulletins on television
regularly featured Muslim leaders meeting the Prime Minister
in Downing Street, while a satellite channel featured debates
by British parliamentarians on the problem of British Muslim
potential treason. Alongside this, Muslim polemicists wrote
critical columns in the British press.21 This cascade of public
opinion and information was augmented by a series of polls
and surveys and followed by the publication of four reports
on inner city Pakistani riots during the summer of 2001 in
Oldham and other Northern towns.22
News journalism resembles anthropology in looking to the
particular for a broader message. But journalists also have an
advantage over anthropologists in that in times of crisis their
reach is immense. The power of the press and media is such
that both politicians and ordinary people will express their
opinions and even their most intimate thoughts to the media,
in the hope of reaching a broader audience. We can say that,
like anthropologists, journalists believe in mediated ethnog-
raphy. But at the same time, unlike anthropologists, jour-
nalists speak to the highest in the land as well as the lowest,
from the British Prime Minister to the controversial cleric of
an extremist mosque in an obscure London suburb. An an-
thropologist who enters such a radical mosque at a time of
heightened tension and suspicion existing in Britain today is
likely to be suspected of being an agent, an undercover jour-
nalist, or a clandestine TV photographer. Several television
stations in Britain, including the BBC and Channel 4, have
beamed a series of expose´s of the radical discourses enunciated
in local mosques, based on such clandestine filming.23
Anthropology and the Study of Islamic
Radicalization
Can anthropologists study Islamic radicalization without
compromising the discipline, endangering anthropologists in
the field or queering the pitch for future anthropological re-
search? What specific ethical responsibilities do anthropolo-
gists bear toward the discipline and the people they study?
Other disciplines can resort to trawling radical groups’ Web
21. Among these, Akbar S. Ahmed, an anthropologist, has been one
of the most distinguished, regularly commenting on unfolding political
events in South Asia and the diaspora on the BBC and other media,
including British, Pakistani, and American daily newspapers.
22. For details and a full discussion, see Bagguley and Hussain (2008).
The riots in August 2001 tended to get conflated in the public and political
imagination with the ”problem” of young Muslims in the aftermath of
9/11.
23. For a review of these expose´s, see Werbner 2009.
sites, reports in the press, or whistle-blowers’ accounts.24 The
Islamist by Ed Husain (2007), for example, recounts the career
of a born-again radical who moved from his parents’ Sufi
order through a series of increasingly radicalized groups and
finally back to Sufi spirituality. Moazzam Begg’s autobio-
graphical account records his journey through a range of
Middle Eastern countries, arrest in Afghanistan, and intern-
ment in Guantanamo Bay (Begg 2006). Another such life
story, Leaving Al-Qaeda, by Hassan Butt, scheduled to appear
in 2007, turned out to be a sham and Butt’s radical past
something of a fantasy that was repeatedly sold to a gullible
press.25 Terrorist profiling appears to be a key pastime of
counterterrorist experts, but deeper probing finds all kinds
of complex personal histories, as in the case of one of the
July 7, 2005, London suicide bombers, Muhammad Sadiq
Khan, whose bitter family rift over his marriage may hold the
key to his radicalization (Malik 2007).
It is, perhaps, unsurprising that government pressure to
appear relevant has impelled the Economic and Social Re-
search Council (ESRC) of Great Britain to fund research on
Islamic radicalization. Nor is the Council content with mere
armchair research of Web sites. The Council’s joint research
program, with funding from the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office (FCO) and the Humanities Board, was initiated in 2006
and in 2007 renamed New Security Challenges: “Radicalisa-
tion” and Violence. The connection between supposedly in-
dependent scientific research and government policy was ex-
plicitly spelled out in the first-round outline:
The FCO wants outstanding research to inform the policy
making process. The FCO’s interest in this initiative stems
from the recognition that independent, high-quality re-
search on radicalisation issues can inform UK Counter Ter-
rorism policy overseas. As part of the Prevent strand of that
policy in particular,26 the FCO seeks to use research to in-
crease its knowledge and understanding of the factors as-
sociated with radicalisation in those countries and regions
identified as high priority. The Prevent strand is concerned
with tackling the radicalisation of individuals, both in the
UK and elsewhere, which sustains the international terrorist
threat. The Government seeks to do this by, among other
things, deterring those who facilitate terrorism and those
who encourage others to become terrorists by changing the
24. Olivier Roy’s (2004) fine study of Islamic neofundamentalist move-
ments is almost entirely based on surveys of their Web sites, supplemented
by newspaper accounts and casual discussions. Trawling the World Wide
Web, I myself found a wealth of information on jihadi terror camps,
radical Muslim organizations, and actors, all available without leaving
my study.
25. See, e.g., this Web site: http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/
society/law_order/hassanbuttfreedamidscamclaims/2264552
26. The “Prevent Strategy” is a British Home Office initiative to chal-
lenge violent extremist ideology and support vulnerable individuals (HM
Government 2008). Available on http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/violentextre-
mism/downloads/Prevent%20Strategy%20A%20Guide%20for%20Local
%20Partners%203%20June%202008.pdf (visited February 5, 2010).
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environment in which the extremists and those radicalising
others can operate, [and] engaging in the battle of ideas by
challenging the ideologies that extremists believe can justify
the use of violence, primarily by helping Muslims who wish
to dispute these ideas to do so.
In the first-round outline, 10 regional annexes and within
them several country-specific outlines were included. The
program asked researchers in all these countries to
name and assess the key figures (moderate and extreme)
and key groups (including charities and proselytizing reli-
gious groups) influencing the local population in each re-
gion, to assess the role of informal networks, information
networks and rumours in spreading messages that encour-
age radicalisation, [to] describe the attitude of each coun-
try’s government and assess the effectiveness of its measures
for dealing with terrorism both within and beyond its bor-
ders; [to] assess the response of governments to the chal-
lenge of ideas, what counter-radicalisation strategies have
been used, their success or failure; [and to] indicate the
impact of events in specific countries on UK ethnic com-
munities originating from those areas.
In addition, it asked researchers in Pakistan, for example, to
“assess the effect of AQ/terrorist propaganda on the wider
population; assess the degree to which the armed forces have
been radicalised; assess the role of madrassas as radicalising
factors; to what extent is radicalisation caused by radicalized
individuals from the Pakistani diaspora returning to
Pakistan?”27
Following the outcry that ensued when the program was
first publicized, the ESRC redrafted the initiative (with fund-
ing increased to £2.5 million!) but retained clause 3.2 outlin-
ing the objectives of the FCO. In protest, the anthropologist
on the committee (Jonathan Spencer) and the international
relations scholar (John Sidel) both resigned. The anthropo-
logical community in Britain, through its Heads of Depart-
ments forum, also expressed its strong objections, and these
were publicized in an October 20, 2006, London Times Higher
Education Supplement, with minor dissent (Baty 2006).28 Sup-
port came from the European Association for Middle Eastern
Studies and the Middle East Studies Association of North
America, adding their voice to the British Society for Middle
Eastern Studies. These learned societies expressed concern
that the program had “crossed the line” separating scholarly
academic social science research “from the foreign policy, mil-
27. Documentation on this program and the correspondence sur-
rounding it is available from the author and from John Gledhill, at the
time chair of the Association of Social Anthropologists of the U.K. and
the Commonwealth, Department of Social Anthropology, Manchester
University.
28. See Baty (2006). A minority of Heads of Departments disagreed.
The various articles debating the ESRC program can be found at the
Times Higher Education Web site: http://www.timeshighereducation.co
.uk/search_results.asp?qkeywordpGledhill&categoriesp0&sectionsp0
&issuep0&xp28&yp14.
itary, and intelligence agencies of the government and their
policy and research agendas.” They pointed out “the special
sensitivity of research relating to the Middle East and the
Muslim world at the present time.” Moreover, they argued,
“the initiative’s focus, and the partial funding it receives from
the FCO, may heighten the dangers faced by British and other
scholarly researchers studying the Middle East and Muslim
world.” This argument was echoed in an anthropology Heads
of Departments meeting: the request to name potential rad-
icals “could jeopardise the granting of research visas in India,
would place researchers in the Philippines in danger, and
could lead to the ‘disappearance’ of named informants in a
number of South or Latin American countries.”29 One letter
made the point that “the programme entails a series of ex-
tremely specific intelligence-driven questions that start from
the premise of a link between Islam, radicalization (nowhere
defined!) and terrorism,” and that the “overtly security-
research agenda” could endanger the very “physical well-being
of anthropologists.”30 In a joint letter of the Association of
Social Anthropologists (ASA), the British Sociological Asso-
ciation, Development Studies Association, Academy of
Learned Societies Social Sciences, Council of Professors, and
Heads of Departments of Sociology, this problem of “risks
posed to the security and reputation of British researchers
overseas” was reiterated, with the ASA “strongly disasso-
ciat[ing]” the anthropological community from the program.
In its annual business meeting, the association resolved not
to participate in peer review of applications for the program.
In response to the barrage of complaints, the ESRC defended
its position by arguing that not to disclose FCO involvement
and funding might have risked accusations of acting covertly,
and it proposed a continued dialogue with the ASA.
Despite the protests, the program has gone ahead and has
elicited a rush of applications. Although modified it appears
to have kept its original aims.31 It bears out my argument put
here that anthropologists who study the everyday cannot take
on the role of spies who study underground networks or
pronounce authoritatively on cataclysmic crises and global
terror from the position of insider experts; doing so may
compromise professional ethics and endanger fellow anthro-
pologists. Similar arguments have been made against embed-
ded anthropologists in the United States military.32 Thus Gus-
terson (2003:25) has argued that “anthropologists have a
professional obligation to one another not to conduct slash-
29. Minutes of meeting held at University College London on No-
vember 28, 2006. Full text available from the author.
30. E-mail written by Dr. Martha Mundy to Heads of Departments,
the London School of Economics, at the start of the debate.
31. See the Warwick University Web site of the program: http://
www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/research/nsc/ and especially the report
of the first meeting with the FCO: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/
pais/research/nsc/events/nscrvmeeting/.
32. See, e.g., contributions to the debate in Anthropology Today by
Gonza´lez (2007a, 2007b), Gusterson (2003, 2005, 2007), Price (2007),
and Kilcullen (2007).
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and-burn fieldwork,” while Gonza´lez (2007b:19) proposes
that “when such work is performed clandestinely this un-
dermines and endangers the work of anthropologists more
generally, not to mention their families and informants, po-
tentially putting them at risk.”
The personal dangers of first-hand investigative reporting,
even for seasoned journalists, were underlined by the murder
of Wall Street journalist Daniel Pearl in Karachi in 2002. The
context of the murder, Karachi, is instructive and bears on
anthropological research as well. According to Robert Sam
Anson (2002),
For a time in the early 1990s, violence in Karachi was so
endemic that the army took over from the cops. When the
troops pulled out, killings started averaging eight per day—
and those were merely the ones involving political and crim-
inal gangs. No one bothered to count the shootings, bomb-
ings, garrotings, and throat slittings between ethnic and re-
ligious groups, much less the toll racked up in quotidian
armed robberies, home invasions, and just-for-the-hell-of-
it sniper slayings.
In Pakistan in 2008, semiclandestine militant groups fight-
ing in Kashmir—the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, and other hard-liner
religious groups; the army, the police, intelligence, and rogue
ISI elements; political parties, drug crime syndicates, and
other mafia—operated with apparent impunity. Suicide
bombers attacked politicians, the army, police barracks, shop-
ping malls, hotels, and restaurants. Religious zealots burned
CDs and DVDs and banned cinemas and civic public spaces
of consumption, entertainment, and desire. In such a context
any research on Islamic radicalization is dangerous. Daniel
Pearl was warned by one Pakistani journalist that “They (Al-
Qaeda) may be here, but [it] is impossible for you to meet
them or me to meet them. They are all wanted and they
would like to stay quiet. Especially they won’t be meeting an
American journalist.” But this did not deter him. “I told him,
‘If you try too hard, it could be risky.’ But he was very focused.
There are rules for journalists in war zones of what not to do
to stay alive. Danny ignored these rules.” Another local expert
said, “Danny got more and more confident. This was the
biggest thing that hit him. He was suddenly having access
and chasing down an area where he had no expertise. I mean,
Danny just didn’t have it.” An investigative reporter at The
News, a Pakistani newspaper, quoted a senior Pakistani official
as saying, “An India-based Jewish reporter serving a largely
Jewish media organisation should have known the hazards of
exposing himself to radical Islamic groups, particularly those
who recently got crushed under American military might.”
Anson refers in his article to a shadowy figure, Shaikh
Mubarak Ali Shah Gilani, allegedly an Al-Qaeda operative,
who Pearl was expecting to meet, believing he had recruited
Richard Reid, the American Airlines failed shoe bomber. Al-
though the topic of Shaikh Gilani, the militant Sufi, is beyond
this paper, my online research on the shaikh is instructive to
the argument presented here. I had met Shaikh Mubarak,
who is related by marriage to a close Pakistani friend of mine,
briefly during earlier fieldwork in the 1970s, and until recently,
his English-medium school in Islamabad was attended by the
daughters of another Pakistani friend, before it closed down
suddenly following the events surrounding Pearl’s assassi-
nation. Testing my capacity to pronounce on radical Al-Qaeda
supporters for purposes of this article, I discovered a wealth
of information about the shaikh on the Web, mainly taken
from newspaper articles, much of it alleging crime and se-
dition by his followers against the United States and his con-
nections to, alternatively, the Pakistani ISI, the CIA, and Al-
Qaeda33—accusations rejected by Shaikh Mubarak and his
followers on his own Web site.34 After a close reading of this
range of sources, I reached the conclusion that allegations
that Shaikh Mubarak had preached a violent Islam in America
or was closely connected to Al-Qaeda are hard to substantiate
on the basis of published news sources, though it is conceiv-
able that a few of his more ardent U.S. followers engaged in
violence against other religious groups. Despite a host of al-
legations, he was never imprisoned, and the accusations of
his involvement in Daniel Pearl’s abduction and assassination
were dropped. It is most unlikely that he ever knew Richard
Reid. The transnational organization the shaikh, as a living
Sufi saint, appears to have built up is composed of African-
American followers organized in branches throughout the
United States. If true, this quite remarkable organizational
achievement highlights the extraordinary qualities of inven-
tiveness and imagination Shaikh Mubarak has brought to this
project and his willingness to transgress conventional bound-
aries and explore the unknown.
The ambiguities surrounding the study of terror, terrorists,
and terror networks are highlighted by the case of this Sufi
warrior (if indeed he is one), illustrating the fact that au-
thoritatively presented Web sites have to be treated with great
caution. They also make evident the deep anthropological
truth that fact is stranger than fiction, that however much
security forces attempt to profile the ideal-type terrorist, there
is no single “identikit” that can portray the reality on the
ground. Shaikh Gilani’s unusual profile underlines the im-
possibility for anthropologists of studying Islamic terror via
the media and the pitfalls of trying to rely on journalists’
accounts that simplify and sort the illogical, unknown, and
contentious. The case of Hassan Butt, the self-proclaimed
jihadist whose numerous newspaper interviews were exposed
as a fabrication perpetrated on a gullible press, is a further
33. On Shaikh Mubarak, see Anson (2002), Hussain (2007:123), the
Boston Globe, and the following: http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/
03/13/60II/main503644.shtml, http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/
pakistan/terroristoutfits/jamaat-ul-fuqra.htm, http://s3.amazonaws.com/
911timeline/2002/bostonglobe010602.html, and http://www
.militantislammonitor.org/article/id/847. Leonard (2003), in her survey
of Muslims in the United States, makes no mention of this group.
34. See http://www.iqou-moa.org/rebuttals/slander_against_muslim
_communities_miss_the_mark.htm, http://www.iqou-moa.org/open
_letters/index.htm, and http://www.holyislamvillesc.org/sheikh/.
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warning of the unreliability of using news reports as the main
sources of empirical fact in serious academic research (see n.
25).
In his semifictional diary of a Colombian town he knew
well, Michael Taussig depicts the inherent ambiguities of a
field in which local people attempt to account for inexplicable
disappearances and deaths, perpetrated by multiple armed
groups—militants, mafiosi, guerrilla, paramilitaries, the army,
the police, and young delinquents (Taussig 2003). In such a
nightmarish world, reality becomes a suppressed yet menacing
and terrifying “public secret” (Taussig 1999). “Truth” is un-
certain, and there is a constant struggle to make sense of
events and facts “on the ground” that refuse to fit any neat,
coherent logic, as Winifred Tate demonstrates in her hugely
insightful study of human rights development and activism
in Columbia (Tate 2007). It is probable that a similar am-
biguity pervades the world of Islamic militancy, despite at-
tempts by counterterrorist experts to strip away this unpre-
dictable quality or the uniqueness of its actors. Only an
embedded anthropological study can produce a textured rich-
ness that discloses the unexpected, the unstereotypical, even
the unimaginable, hinted at by the Web site accounts of Shaikh
Mubarak, the warrior saint.35
Crises of the Longue Dure´e
Despite the fact that the British secret service increasingly
appears to have gained command of Britain’s Islamic terror
networks, the ESRC program and others like it indicate that
the insights of embedded ethnographers are still being sought
by policy makers. As the global crisis of Islamic terror becomes
one of the longue dure´e, anthropologists are able to say more
about the way the crisis has affected ordinary Muslims (Abbas
2005:144–163) and public debates among Muslims (Lewis
2007) or between them and British politicians (Werbner
2009). It is now possible to write about the impact of the so-
called war of terror on the stigmatization of U.K. Muslims.
A few examples will suffice: on a visit to a minor saint’s
congregation in Manchester in March 2008, I commented
jokingly that I had become “half a Muslim,” to which one of
the shaikh’s devotees, a sophisticated businessman who travels
regularly to India, responded, jokingly but with barely dis-
guised bitterness, “Don’t say that. Then you’ll be related to
Osama bin Laden!” For British Muslims, being tarred with
the brush of extremism has become a daily burden. The in-
cessant newspaper headlines reporting on extremist plots cast
a shadow on their everyday lives. A Pakistani friend told me
that traveling on a local bus in a suburb of Manchester one
day, she noticed that the people around her were reading a
free newspaper with the front page headline “terror plot un-
covered.” She sat back in her seat, helplessly wondering what
they thought of her. Such stories—of being stared at suspi-
35. On the unexpected in the context of violence in Sindh, see the
anthropological studies of Verkaaik (2004) and Ring (2007).
ciously in queues, at airports or in shops—abound, revealing
the sense of estrangement that the so-called war on terror has
generated. Most Pakistanis are avid television viewers, but this
merely compounds their sense of alienation as the immediacy
of suffering by coreligionists in Israel, Iraq, Palestine, or Af-
ghanistan is tangibly experienced by viewers.36
If journalists compose their reports from other people’s
reports, cutting, snipping, and pasting, so too, increasingly,
do modern-day anthropologists. Where anthropologists may
gain a momentary insight beyond that of foreign correspon-
dents, it is because they know a local culture beyond crisis,
in its quotidian daily forms, or as it has responded to earlier
crises. It is this dialectical tension between a cataclysmic event
and the continuities of everyday life that needs to be under-
stood. Past memories and current expectations shape the par-
tial, meroscopic political visions of people responding to a
present crisis.37
Conclusion
It is tempting to believe that public anthropology can say
something relevant about global crises like September 11, that
our insights and disciplinary knowledge count in the public
forums where policy is made. But while global crises are ex-
perienced in our own fieldwork backyard, they are not nor-
mally generated there. We need constantly to remind ourselves
that today’s political crisis soon becomes yesterday’s news and
that our anthropological ventures into print are often irrel-
evant even before they appear. This, paradoxically, may be
anthropology’s greatest strength—our knowledge of the quo-
tidian and the intimate, of ordinary people beyond crisis. In
an oblique critique of Said’s Orientalism (Said 1978), Talal
Asad revised his earlier accusation (Asad 1973) of anthro-
pological complicity with the colonial enterprise:
The role of anthropologists in maintaining structures of
imperial domination has, despite slogans to the contrary,
usually been trivial; the knowledge they produced was often
too esoteric for government use, and even where it was
usable it was marginal in comparison to the vast body of
information routinely accumulated by merchants, mission-
aries, and administrators. (Asad 1991:315)
So too, in our information-rich, media-saturated society,
Muslim responses to the events following September 11 have
been closely monitored by journalists and their stringers, gov-
ernment researchers, and spies, and along with them an army
of Islam watchers trawling the Internet: political scientists,
orientalists, Muslim columnists, and British policy makers.
Events have followed each other in quick succession since
9/11: the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the expansion of the
36. On television viewing after 9/11, see Gillespie (2006).
37. I use “meroscopic” in Imagined Diasporas (Werbner 2002a) to refer
to the positioned, and hence partial, political fabulations of different
diasporic actors.
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so-called global war on terror to many widely separated fronts,
the 2005 London underground bombing, the Danish cartoon
affair, and by 2006, the serial arrest of young Muslims, the
majority being British Pakistanis who were charged (and in-
creasingly found guilty) of various seditious conspiracies.38 I
was in Britain on 9/11 when the World Trade Center was
bombed in New York, and in Botswana on 7/7 when the
London underground was bombed. I watched both events on
the BBC and CNN along with the rest of the world’s popu-
lation. I did not attend the protests over the cartoon affair
in London, which glorified terror, though I did participate in
the huge peace march against Iraq before the war started. To
the best of my knowledge, perhaps with the exception of one
Pakistani warrior saint, I had never known a member of Al-
Qaeda or any other illegal or terrorist organization.39 Nor had
I ever visited any clandestine jihadi training camps in Pakistan
as radicalized British Pakistanis allegedly do. What privileged
insights do I, an anthropologist, have to be able to comment
on any of these events? But the question can be turned round:
do anthropologists have a duty to speak out on public affairs
that affect the communities they have studied, along with
other so-called academic experts?40 Is there a sensibility de-
veloped through lengthy fieldwork that gives us a specific
standpoint from which to view these crises?
Whatever their origins, these days anthropologists increas-
ingly study people who are the victims of violent and hu-
manitarian crises, of civil war, incurable disease, and the fall-
out from global or state terror. Our conceptual tools have
had to be stretched beyond their limits to comprehend such
events. Our ethnographic mediations necessarily start from
the bottom—from the small places where we do our ordinary,
quotidian research. If we rely on journalistic accounts to sup-
plement our knowledge of small places, to contextualize and
broaden our perspective, perhaps this is because journalism
is, somewhat paradoxically, a cognate discipline, one that cre-
ates its own ethnographic mediations from the collocation of
many small places.
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Comments
Masooda Bano
Department of International Development, University of
Oxford, 3 Mansfield Road, Oxford OX1 3TB, United
Kingdom (masooda.bano@wolfson.ox.ac.uk). 26 X 09
In commenting on Pnina Werbner’s paper, I must start with
two qualifiers: (1) I am not an anthropologist but a social
scientist who draws upon ethnography as an especially useful
technique to study the processes of Islamic radicalization, and
(2) I study radicalization in Muslim societies and not in di-
aspora. However, like Pnina, I have been approached to in-
form policy on global terror and like her have questioned my
qualifications to illuminate this process. I will respond to three
specific points that Pnina has raised: the relevance of an-
thropology for studying global terror, the ability of the Muslim
communities to speak for themselves, and the moral dilemmas
faced by the U.K. academics when faced with a joint Economic
and Social Research Council/Foreign and Commonwealth Of-
fice (ESRC/FCO) research call to study global terror.
Pnina has provided an extremely eloquent account of the
internal tensions faced by a conscientious academic trying to
understand the working of Muslim societies at a time when
policy circles have a noticeable appetite for such research. As
an anthropologist, she is not convinced that the study of
ordinary Muslim communities can help illuminate global ter-
ror, she worries about the possible breach of trust of one’s
respondents, and she wonders whether anthropologists have
anything more to add than journalists. Is anthropology at all
relevant? she asks. In the past 5 years, I have undertaken a
large-scale study of madrasas in Pakistan that aims to un-
derstand the basis of their demand and to explore their pos-
sible links with jihad. I have focused on eight districts of
Pakistan and have used multiple research methods, including
interviews, survey, and ethnography. In my own experience,
ethnography, the ability to immerse oneself in the given com-
munity, remains the most powerful technique to understand
how religious beliefs get radicalized.
Militant Islam survives not only because of religious in-
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doctrination of a few but because of the popular appeal it
enjoys in many sections of the Muslim societies. If Islamic
terror is to be addressed, its basis of appeal within Muslim
societies has to be understood. Such an understanding can
be acquired only by using notes from a number of small places
to inform the global picture. Thus, the answer to whether
anthropology is relevant to the study of global terror rests in
the nature of the research question. If the objective is to trace
Al-Qaeda’s financial flows, undoubtedly the intelligence agen-
cies are better placed to answer that. If, however, the focus
is to understand the forces leading to popularization of radical
views in Muslim societies or developing an understanding of
which segments of a given Muslim population are most likely
to respond to radical groups, I have no doubt that the an-
thropology of Muslim society has a lot to contribute.
Such a broader conception of radicalization does not nec-
essarily make a researcher approach her respondents with
suspicion—something that Pnina fears. Rather, it implies
starting the research with an assumption that there has to be
some logic to why the radicalization process, despite is ap-
parent futility, continues to hold an appeal for many Muslims.
In my own research, I have found the ulama within the
madrasas in Pakistan keen to engage because they wanted
their viewpoint exposed to the Western audience. I therefore
do not fully agree with Pnina’s claim that these communities
do not need researchers to put forward their claims. The Sufi
that Pnina studies in Manchester might want to hold his own
audience. However, his audience will surely not be the same
as that of an academic, nor would his arguments hold the
same legitimacy as those advanced by an academic.
Finally, while I fully understand Pnina’s discomfort and
those of others senior colleagues who took a strong position
on the ESRC/FCO joint research call, I do not think boy-
cotting such calls is the best strategy. Pnina argues that such
research calls encourage researchers to take high risk, as did
the American journalist Daniel Pearl. Such a position runs
the slippery slope of eventually suggesting that because of
volatile political situations or armed conflict, some countries
are unfit to study. As an academic who belongs to one such
country, namely, Pakistan, such a stance is worrying. If in-
creased funds are being made available for the study of Islamic
radicalization, then academics need to engage with the re-
search councils skillfully to ensure that the funds are used for
the right studies. I did not apply for the ESRC/FCO joint call,
but I have benefited from other ESRC funds. The ESRC never
told me what I should or should not study.
Thus, while it has been a pleasure to engage with Pnina’s
thoughts on this subject, my research has brought me to slightly
different conclusions. If we draw on ethnography as a specific
technique to answer clearly identified questions, if we engage
with the Muslim communities not as helpless victims but as
purposeful agents capable of explaining the logic of their ac-
tions, and if we as researchers are confident of our own ability
to use the research grants to meet high research standards, then
I think the anthropological notes from small places can go a
long way to highlighting the causes of global terror.
William O. Beeman
Department of Anthropology, University of Minnesota, 395
HHH Center, 301 19th Avenue S, Minneapolis, Minnesota
55455, U.S.A. (wbeeman@umn.edu). 22 X 09
I sympathize with Pnina Werbner’s frustration at applying
anthropological insight to matters of immediate concern in
the Islamic world. However, I do object to her implication
that there is a necessary separation between anthropology and
writing for the public—otherwise known as journalism.
American anthropologists have, in my opinion, largely
shirked their duty to communicate with the public about the
cultural underpinnings of current events. In short, we must
engage in journalistic analysis in order to protect the intel-
lectual integrity of public discourse. The rest of the world
does this. Look at Europe and Latin America, where university
professors are featured prominently in the news media all the
time with great effectiveness and benefit for the public.
Professor Werbner cites one of my opinion pieces that has
been reprinted in an anthology (Beeman 2001). In fact, I have
published more than 600 opinion pieces since 1979, many of
them dealing specifically with public misunderstanding of ter-
rorism and the dynamics surrounding it. These works, as well
as much of my academic writing, deal not only with terrorism
itself but with the “culture of U.S. foreign relations,” which
gives rise to myths and misconceptions about terrorists and
terrorism—the message being that “terrorism” is itself a cul-
tural construction that distorts understanding of the real
causes and dynamics of violence in the Middle East and else-
where (Beeman 1986a, 1986b, 1986c).
Journalistic accounts cannot be used reliably as exclusive
sources of information for commentary and analysis, but they
can be used effectively when the anthropologist in question
has sufficient experiential background to make sense of them.
The significant elements of any news story leap off the page
to the trained anthropological eye. Similarly, distortions and
impossibilities are equally apparent. For example, journalistic
reports of U.S. government claims that Iran was supporting
Al-Qaeda can immediately be seen as absurd when one realizes
that the extreme Sunni conservatism of Al Qaeda sanctions
the killing of Shiite Muslims—the dominant sect in Iran—
on the basis that they are heretical.
My recent book, The “Great Satan” vs. the “Mad Mullahs”:
How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other (Beeman
2005, 2008), deals extensively with such public misunder-
standings not only about Iran but about the dynamics of
relations between Middle East populations and the West. It
censures bad journalism and praises good journalism.
I write this not to tout my own work but rather to insist
that anthropologists definitely have a strong role in blasting
public misconceptions about the Middle East and especially
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in countering ideological writers who try to mislead Western
publics about the nature of these phenomena. In the last 2
decades, organizations such as the American Enterprise In-
stitute and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy have
put huge publicity machines in place to pump misleading
commentary into the news media—commentary that is
largely prejudicial to the Islamic world. These “think tanks”
frequently hire PhD researchers to give a patina of scholarly
respectability to their work, but the ideological color in their
output is unmistakable, and it is all the more apparent since
they rarely if ever publish in academic, peer-reviewed
publications.
It is very hard for real academic researchers to break
through this wall of propaganda, but we must try. For those
interested in trying, I have written two guides to this kind of
writing (Beeman 1987, 2001). I urge every anthropologist
reading this to make a serious effort to counter prejudice and
misinformation though public outreach. It can be frustrating,
but when the public is presented with real information rather
than ideological blather, they respond with positive interest
and, frequently, relief at encountering understanding in depth.
John R. Bowen
Department of Anthropology, Washington University,
Campus Box 1114, St. Louis, Missouri 63130, U.S.A.
(jbowen@wustl.edu). 29 X 09
In asking what anthropologists can say about jihadism, Pnina
Werbner gives us a tour (de force) of public anthropology,
the relative merits of journalism and anthropology, the study
of violence, jihadists and Islamists (more below), and the
ethics of participating in government-run antiterrorist pro-
grams, and she reflects on the question of what the study of
the ordinary can say, if anything, about the extraordinary. She
reminds us of ways we might draw on our studies of violence
in other contexts to examine jihadism and points to some of
the rather ill-informed claims made about supposed radical
Muslims that a bit of online research can defuse rather well.
What is less clear at the end is what we should be doing
or even who the “we” should be. The “implicit anthropolog-
ical theory of jihadism” for which she calls would, I would
think, examine mechanisms and processes of recruitment,
leadership and communication, radical commitment (even to
the point of suicide), and the relationships between religious
education and specific acts of violence. Surely this kind of
venture calls for multiple kinds of expertise.
We do have some of the elements already, in ways that both
give us insight into these processes and help to “explode es-
sentialized stereotypes” about Muslims and Islam, an an-
thropological endeavor given perhaps somewhat shorter shrift
here than it merits. Let me mention two. The forensic psy-
chiatrist and counterrorism consultant Marc Sageman, hardly
suspected of papering over uncomfortable truths, argues that
young men join Al-Qaeda when, away from home, they find
themselves with a “bunch of guys” who just happen to be
convinced of the jihadist mission. This conclusion differs from
the idea widely held by the public that it is Islamic teachers
in Pakistan or France who are actively recruiting these men
from their own local religious schools. He also concludes that
had these men had a better understanding of Islam, they
would not have been led so easily into terrorism: “It follows
that more religious education for these young men might have
been beneficial” (Sageman 2008:60). This sort of work is
hugely useful when we engage in debates with those who argue
that “Islam is the menace” in Europe. Werbner mentions Quin-
tan Wictorowitcz (2005), but in fact a number of younger
political scientists are studying recruitment to various Islamic
groups in England and elsewhere. From them we learn to dif-
ferentiate between calls to violence and calls for other sorts of
activity, branded “radical” in the media (and sometimes by
Werbner) but better understood as separatist or pietist.
As colleagues we work in different disciplines and with
diverse methods, and that seems to me to strengthen the cases
we wish to make, because the studies triangulate on certain
conclusions. Werbner ask what the anthropologist’s compar-
ative advantage might be in all this. As she says, most of us
do not know any jihadists, or at least we do not know if we
do know any. But we do know quite a bit about Islam, blamed
by many as the source of violence, and we know what we
know in a way that allows us to critique these simplistic views.
Let me suggest two such ways.
First, we can and do argue that people take diverse messages
from the same scriptural passages. One’s legal school, regional
tradition, and the exigencies of the strategic moment all shape
how one reads a Quranic verse or a report of the Prophet
Muhammad’s statements and acts. In emphasizing that in-
terpretation is a human act we often contradict Muslim schol-
ars who insist that there is but one message or that “Islam is
a religion of peace,” statements that convince no one—us,
because they essentialize, and the wider public, because they
read about jihad.
Second, we can and do critique the notion of “Islamism,”
used relatively uncritically here, for its tendency to lump to-
gether movements or individuals seeking to create religious
institutions in their societies, those seeking to fashion a state
around religious teachings and those seeking to subvert or
attack democratic governments. Among groups with relatively
radical messages, it becomes even more important to identify
these differences. Rather than calling the Hizb ut-Tahrıˆr “ji-
hadist,” as does Werbner, we might wish instead to study the
everyday lives of its members and the nature of its message,
which in England has been closer to Christian fundamental-
ists’ call to separate from society and to wait for the arrival
of a suitable religious time, than the more violent preaching
of Al-Muhajairun. These are the sorts of anthropological en-
deavors that ought to have a direct bearing on public un-
derstandings of Islam and of pathways to violence.
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Iain R. Edgar
Department of Anthropology, Durham University, Dawson
Building, South Road, Durham DH1 3LE, United Kingdom
(i.r.edgar@durham.ac.uk). 24 IX 09
In this paper Pnina Werbner raises very timely and thought-
provoking questions about the possible contribution of an-
thropological expertise to understanding contemporary mil-
itant Islamic jihadism following the collective trauma of 9/11
and other military actions by Al-Qaeda and its global affiliates.
Her concerns and arguments clearly arise from the many
media commentaries of various kinds that she has been asked
to give in recognition of her very considerable understanding
of Islamic communitas, gained through her ethnographic
practice of localized Pakistani and Pakistani diaspora eth-
nographic settings. Yet, she has to her own knowledge, pre-
sumably like almost every other anthropologist, never actually
met a militant member of such a group as Al-Qaeda, and she
asks how and whether her anthropological expertise can ac-
tually add more information, indeed as much as a finely
grained journalistic account. Anthropologists, Pnina argues,
do indeed gather and gain in-depth knowledge of both explicit
and implicit knowledge of the world views of their informants
and the bounded groups to which they belong, but what
happens when such insightful and empathic knowledge is
assumed to be transferable to such hidden Islamist groups?
“Not a lot” is part of the answer, hence the anthropological
blues she has encountered.
Certainly Pnina outlines well how anthropologists can un-
dertake engaged anthropology to give voice to victims’ tes-
timonies, to articulate the worldviews of the perpetrators of
violence, to witness testimonies, and to describe the struggle
of human rights initiatives in violent domains. Rightly, she
acknowledges that such contributions focus on the “aftermath
and consequences of terror” rather than on an analysis of
Islamic militancy and violent jihadism itself. However, the
development and articulation of the “myths and ideologies
of the perpetrators of violence” is a work of supreme im-
portance and, arguably, sufficient to justify the media airtime
for such competent anthropologists. Militant jihadism is an
enigma to most people, especially the deliberate destruction
wrought on himself/herself and often innocent others by the
suicide bomber or Shahada. The articulation of how an angry
well-educated second- or third-generation Pakistani militant
can convert the anger he or she feels, in common with most
of their community, over the militant and hypocritical behavior
of the United States and the United Kingdom in their Middle
Eastern foreign policy, into the mind-set and practice of a su-
icide bomber, seems to me to be an eminently and profoundly
important contribution. Most people just don’t get it!
“We love death, while you love life” is another difficult-
to-grasp concept for the secularist West, which can be his-
torically and culturally contextualized in terms of spiritually
inspired altruistic suicide—witness the Christian martyrdom
traditions. Islam is not distinct from the other Abrahamic
faiths and indigenous wisdom traditions in its promulgation
of hidden worlds and heavens and hells, though their “con-
tent” may be ecologically different, albeit invisible.
Pnina also outlines a possible core set of features of global
jihadism as being millennial, Manichean, altruistic, and char-
acterized by “infinitely nuanced scholastic distinctions” in
their perspectives and rules. Surely such analysis is important
and helpful even if the world leaders most engaged in the
Iraq war had their ears glued either to their inner deities and/
or estimates of Iraqi oil reserves. Anthropologists, like well-
informed journalists, can to a degree analyze the outer and
inner creative factors leading to militant jihadism through
their awareness and study of group and personal constructions
of identity, group process, and radicalization. Why and how
a jihadist’s allegiance to a transnational Islamic Ummah is
stronger than to a nation-state that has educated them is not
intrinsically different, perhaps, from how some Christians or
even perhaps Rotarians may see themselves.
Journalists, of course, often get to meet militant jihadists,
and they often get to outlive them too. Moreover, they often
have as much if not more historical and contextual knowledge
of the militant groups they write about, compared to an-
thropologists. Osama bin Laden was reported to say of Robert
Fisk, of the United Kingdom Independent newspaper, that if
people wanted to understand Al-Qaeda, they should read Fisk.
Certainly in Fisk’s (2009) recent collection of writings on the
Middle East, The Age of the Warrior, every page in its way
spoke “truth to power” indeed. When I interviewed Rahi-
mullah Yusufzai, BBC journalist in Peshawar in 2005, for his
account of the inspirational night dreams of Mullah Omar,
founder of the Taliban (referenced in Werbner’s paper; Edgar
2007), I was awed by his close-to-the-ground experience and
understanding of the genesis of the Taliban, the worldviews
of its members, and his ability to articulate the vitals of such
a right-wing revolutionary movement. Power to both the best
of anthropology and journalism, I say.
Roberto J. Gonza´lez
Department of Anthropology, San Jose State University, San
Jose, California 95192–0113, U.S.A. (roberto.gonzalez@sjsu
.edu). 21 IX 09
Anthropologists who speak out publicly on pressing inter-
national issues face many challenges, and Werbner’s essay
includes useful starting points for discussion. What sorts of
“particular anthropological theoretical or analytical insights”
can one contribute to an understanding of contemporary cri-
ses? Is it possible for an anthropologist whose research is
focused locally to speak with authority on cataclysmic global
events in an “information-rich, media-saturated” society?
How might one communicate effectively with the public with-
out producing “essentialist notions of culture” or becoming
“yet another current affairs analyst”?
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Though Werbner is mostly skeptical about anthropologists’
ability to comment authoritatively on issues of war and peace,
she acknowledges that “if fieldwork taught me one thing, it
is that there is no essential clash of civilizations between the
Muslim world and the West, despite global crises like Sep-
tember 11 and despite attempts by extremists on both sides
to construct an epic conflict in these terms.” Such basic
knowledge underscores the importance of anthropological
participation in public forums, for it is still exceedingly rare
to hear voices that counter the “clash of civilizations” dis-
course clogging television, radio, newspapers, and the Inter-
net. Even as some anthropologists worry about producing
essentialist notions of culture, self-proclaimed “experts”—
myopic, ethnocentric, unimaginative—fill the airwaves in the
United States and beyond. Should we stand aside while the
likes of Bernard Lewis, Thomas Friedman, Dinesh D’Souza,
Robert Kaplan, and Samuel Huntington establish themselves
as culture experts? We are extraordinarily well positioned to
explain to the general public Why America’s Top Pundits Are
Wrong (Besteman and Gusterson 2005).
Werbner seems to view anthropology as a discipline pri-
marily anchored in “small places” and driven methodologically
by participant observation. Clearly Malinowski’s legacy contin-
ues to shape anthropological work, but there are many other
approaches that can help anthropologists transcend “small
places.” Franz Boas’s integrative approach (incorporating ma-
terial culture, language, biology, and culture) contrasts starkly
with the reductionism of today’s technical current-
affairs analysts. The work of Max Gluckman and Eric Wolf,
whose methods exposed the dynamics of power in historical
terms, gives us a means of articulating small places with sweep-
ing global currents—a perspective that typically is absent in
much journalism. And Laura Nader’s notion of “studying up,
down, and sideways”—by analyzing social problems compar-
atively at multiple levels and by questioning received assump-
tions—offers a creative way for anthropologists to confront the
challenge of our time: “never before have so few, by their actions
and inactions, had the power of life and death over so many
members of the species” (Nader 1969:284).
In short, anthropologists have the potential capacity to
speak to broad publics authoritatively because they are gen-
eralists, because they understand power, and because they
challenge accepted premises and categories. Mahmood Mam-
dani (2002, 2007), Paul Farmer (2003 radio interview, 2005),41
Jeff Halper (2008), and Catherine Lutz (2001, 2008 radio
interview)42 provide us with extraordinary examples of how
anthropological perspectives can offer lay audiences fresh in-
sight into contemporary crises. The fact that some people
41. Interviewed by Barbara Bogaev on the radio program Fresh Air
(produced by WHYY Philadelphia and syndicated by National Public
Radio), September 25, 2003, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story
.php?storyIdp1446061.
42. Interviewed by Peter Hart on the radio program CounterSpin (pro-
duced by Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting), June 13, 2008, http://
www.fair.org/index.php?pagep3403.
might describe these scholars as “public intellectuals” or
“citizen-scholars” does not diminish the power of anthro-
pological analysis in their work.
Werbner’s tentative outline of an “anthropological theory
of jihadism” is problematic for several reasons. To begin with,
her uncritical acceptance of the terms “jihadism” and “jihad-
ist” echoes the language of policy makers, spy agencies, and
commercial mass media. Werbner correctly notes that “an-
thropologists have been prominent in trying to explode es-
sentialized stereotypes of all Muslims as terrorists,” so it is
puzzling that she would adopt loaded language that reinforces
these stereotypes.
Another problem with Werbner’s exploration of militant
radicalism is that in her attempt to classify types of jihadist
ideologies and organizational structures, her analysis tends to
focus primarily upon internal dynamics—as if the genesis and
development of these ideas and networks have little to do
with Western imperialism (i.e., Israel’s occupation of Pales-
tinian territories, the United States–led invasion and occu-
pation of Iraq, etc.). It is worth considering Wade Davis’s
post–September 11 reflections on global “interdependence.”
He notes that “anthropology . . . suggests more darkly that
when peoples and cultures are squeezed, extreme ideologies
sometimes emerge, inspired by strange and unexpected beliefs
. . . such movements prove deadly both to their adherents
and to those they engage” (Davis 2002).
Finally, Werbner’s discussion might benefit from a broader,
more comparative perspective. For example, would it not be
important for an anthropological analysis of Al-Qaeda or the
Taliban to consider the possibility that they are “revitalization
movements” sharing certain characteristics with the Native
American Ghost Dance or Melanesian cargo cults (Mooney
1991; Wallace 1956; Worsley 1957)? What about similarities
between the range of contemporary militant religious move-
ments—not only jihadism, but militant evangelical Chris-
tianity, militant Zionism, and other comparable move-
ments—on the rise in the twenty-first century? Treating
cultures of jihadism or martyrdom as special cases in isolation
from the rest of the world tells only part of a much bigger
story.
Robert W. Hefner
Institute on Culture, Religion, and World Affairs, Boston
University, 232 Bay State Road, Boston, Massachusetts
02215 (rhefner@bu.edu). 23 IX 09
Pnina Werbner has provided an important essay on the promise
and perils of anthropological engagements with terror. The
article has Werbner’s trademark qualities of subtlety and insight.
My remarks will focus on just three of the points she raises.
Werbner observes that our ethnographic mediations “start
from the bottom,” from the “small places where we do our
ordinary, quotidian research.” As a result, our methods equip
us with an “aura of insider knowledge.” But they also impose
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limitations when we confront “discourses . . . pervasively
global,” such as those of terror networks.
All this seems true enough. At various points in our lives,
we cultural anthropologists place ourselves in the thick of
field experience, and we privilege those moments because of
the intimacies and subjective refigurations they allow. For an
anthropology of knowledge concerned with the genesis of our
disciplinary practices, however, it is important to add that
field insights are the result of a highly decentered process of
knowledge formation. Anthropological knowledge is never
fully present in the field moment but emerges through a
broader process of cross-cultural and cross-temporal com-
parison. Talal Asad has been the most recent exponent of the
idea that rigorous comparison, not ethnography alone, is an-
thropology’s true analytic core. But the claim was also implicit
in Mary Douglas’s group-grid theory, Marxist anthropology,
cross-cultural studies of human development, the “Social
Studies” approach of the Geertzes, and the historical-mate-
rialist anthropologies of Julian Steward, Marvin Harris, and
Leslie White, to name but a few anthropologies grounded in
the broader sweep. In the aftermath of the critiques and de-
constructions of ethnography in the 1980s, many anthropol-
ogists began to question the possibility of comparison across
cultures. However, not only did it not “go away,” ethnography
is inarticulate without it. It is now more important than ever.
This leads me to a second point, related to Werbner’s wry
reflections on the “anthropological blues” she experienced in
the aftermath of September 11. Like her, I was drawn into
public scholarship at that time, through media and policy
inquiries into “what’s wrong with Islam.” I had a somewhat
different experience than Werbner, however, perhaps related
to the course of public scholarship on Islam in the United
States during the Clinton era.
In 1993, Sam Huntington had launched the first of his
several broadsides concerning the clash of civilizations. The
Muslim world had the most violent borders in his troubled
civilizational imaginary. The argument was not simply aca-
demic. Over his career, Huntington had trained dozens of
U.S. State Department and intelligence officers. If taken se-
riously, his views had dire implications for Western govern-
ments’ engagement with Muslims.
Although in the early 1990s I had begun to conduct annual
research in Indonesia on Muslim democrats and their radical
Islamist rivals, I had not done writing of a public anthro-
pological sort. But I and many other anthropologists with
views of Islam different from Huntington’s were pressed into
that task after the Harvard professor’s pronouncements. Our
engagement intensified after 9/11. Publications and think tank
exchanges left me with the impression not of a dearth of
public anthropologists able to speak with authority but of an
embarrassment of anthropological riches. Needless to say, U.S.
policy was not massively redirected by this public scholarship,
not least with regards to Iraq. Nonetheless, this work had a
significant impact on media and U.S. government engage-
ments with Islam.
This brings me to a third and final point, specifically as
regards terror. In the aftermath of the Bali bombings of Oc-
tober 2002, in which some 200 people died, I conducted a
series of interviews with a few dozen radical Islamists, in-
cluding one known to have had ties to the men who carried
out the Bali killings. I knew this man before the bombings
and respected him. In the late 1980s, he had been tortured
for his views, and he bore himself with great dignity. His
comment in response to the loss of life in Bali nonetheless
surprised me: “Those Western tourists were all going to hell
anyway, so there’s no point in faulting the bombers.”
In the retrospect of our many conversations, my affection
for this man has not diminished. But neither has my disquiet
with his justification of mass killing. My own grappling with
the ethical and epistemological issues posed by terrorism,
then, ends in a somewhat different place than that Werbner
so movingly describes. What is awful about terrorism is not
just that it is pervasively global but that it can be rationalized
down to ethical normalcy or, worse yet, the banal. Under-
standing how this comes to be remains a challenge. But, like
Werbner, I believe we can get a better grasp on the problem
by pushing forward toward more self-conscious juxtaposi-
tions of the local in the global.
Bruce Kapferer
Department of Social Anthropology, University of Bergen,
Fosswinckelsgate 6, Bergen 5007, Norway (bruce.kapferer@
sosantr.uib.no). 22 IX 09
Werbner discusses how the pressures for anthropological rel-
evance to large issues of public concern pushes anthropolo-
gists outside the domains of their knowledge and expertise.
She says that their typical involvement with the local and the
intricacies of everyday practice ill equips them to comment
on major cataclysmic events such as 9/11. Journalists are bet-
ter capable, for their profession drives them towards the nec-
essary insider knowledge and the preparedness to take dan-
gerous risks.
The microwork of the anthropologist, a gaze too often
diverted from the larger scene (I am uncomfortable with the
micro/macro implication of Werbner’s definition of anthro-
pological practice), does not rule out an ability to unravel
forces underlying events of global impact, as exemplified by
Werbner herself. Anthropology can indeed reveal the dynam-
ics giving rise to and extending from events that catch the
public eye (see Sahlins 2005). For anthropologists, hidden
dynamics leading to the disastrous happening of 9/11 are of
less interest than its social and cultural construction as an
event. The 9/11 happening is not an event in an anthropo-
logical sense. Rather it is a happening that becomes an event
through its ongoing sociopolitical construction and gathering
posthappening significance. This is of the greatest import for
populations worldwide in relation to which anthropologists
are well positioned. It was the Bush administration reaction—
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the way it defined the significance of the Twin Towers’ de-
struction—that was one element, among a diversity of other
responses, transmuting a happening into an event of perhaps
irreversible consequence. Such processes of event construction
are part and parcel of anthropological work. Their concern
with the local and the micro facilitates this, although Werb-
ner’s suggestion that this is the key defining character of an-
thropology could be challenged. It leaves out the important
contribution of ethnographically grounded theoretical insight
that anthropologists have built over the generations.
Anthropologists can descriptively and analytically go well
beyond the kinds of insights offered by journalists. They are
not bound by journalistic constraints involving consumerism,
newsworthiness, and an immediately digestible appeal to
commonsense. Anthropology is professionally oriented to a
discourse of suspicion and is given to exposing the prejudicial
and the easy stereotype.
My commitment, as many anthropologists, is to an an-
thropology that is thoroughly and uncompromisingly critical,
often of the taken-for-granted status quo. Anthropological
ethnography contributed to an overcoming, I think, of a ten-
sion in all academic knowledge practices to serve the interests
of the humanity-destroying potential of power (including its
motivating philosophies). Anthropology is often self-margin-
alizing as a function of its fieldwork method and critically so,
as Werbner suggests in Asad’s retreat from certain aspects of
his anthropology-as-colonialism critique.
However, anthropology as an instrument of oppressive
power is possibly more relevant today than ever. The idea of
public anthropology demands deconstruction. In practice,
this often seems to mean that anthropology should be useful
to those who command political and economic interests and
who define the public good. As Werbner notes, we are in an
era of the embedded ethnographer. An Australian adviser to
the American forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, David Kilcul-
len—trained in anthropology and political science (by the
American Carl Thayer in Canberra)—is one such. The role
of anthropological consultants in Timor (Chomsky’s Can-
berra “New Mandarins”) during the Suharto regime is an-
other case in point. Among Australian anthropologists, largely
in Canberra and ANU, a major debate on the Internet is
under way regarding what anthropologists might do about
the plight of aborigines. Remarkably colonialist and pater-
nalist (evident in the very questions being posed), the pro-
tagonists display a “balanced” socially responsible mood often
oblivious to racial and state oppression in which they are
perhaps continuing unconscious agents, as some of their crit-
ics are pointing out (see Australian Anthropological Society
Network). A high proportion of academic and independent
Australian anthropologists are involved in paid and compro-
mising consultancy to government and corporate interest re-
garding aborigines. In bed with the powerful, their critique
is muffled.
Anthropology and its critical potential have encountered
crises before, as during Vietnam, but the risk for anthropology
is greater now. One reason is definitely the widespread changes
of state orders (see Kapferer 2005 for a discussion of the
corporate state) and the situation of universities within them.
Within the haven of the university, anthropologists had rel-
ative intellectual protection and were able to issue critiques
of practical matters affecting the populations among whom
they worked without the risk of having funding and other
support for their research withdrawn. The continuation of
the anthropological project of critical ethnographic enquiry
is contingent on cries for relevance outside the proven knowl-
edge-value of anthropology in itself. If funding is dependent
on criteria defined by political and economic interests of cor-
porate business and state policy, the idea of anthropology is
under threat. In the neoliberal circumstances of the contem-
porary university, the economics of research is dependent
increasingly on anthropological service to pragmatic business
and government interest. Anthropologists in the concern for
department and university economic survival are being driven
to frame grant applications in terms of such epithets of rel-
evance as suffering, poverty, human rights, citizenship, ecol-
ogy, technology, and so on that frequently mask their coop-
tation into a dialectic of control and power in which valuable
anthropological critical capacity may be muted.
Jeremy Keenan
Department of Social Anthropology and Sociology, School
of Oriental and African Studies, London University, 10
Thornhaugh Street, London, WC1H 0XG, United Kingdom
(jeremykeenan@hotmail.com). 23 IX 09
Pnina Werbner raises numerous questions of critical relevance
to our subject, especially that of our relationship with jour-
nalists. She also discusses the importance of engaged, “public”
anthropology; why we should continue to study the local; the
ethics of the United Kingdom’s Economic and Social Research
Council (ESRC), and why anthropologists must “speak out.”
Werbner asks whether we can “rely on journalistic accounts
to supplement our knowledge of small places,” while noting
that “‘news’ as reported by journalists and foreign corre-
spondents has been the dominant source of information for
most public intellectuals including anthropologists in their
commentaries on 9/11 and its aftermath.” It is precisely this
reliance on the news that has made so many “intellectual”
analyses of the post 9/11 situation deeply flawed. Bush’s post-
9/11 global war on terror (GWOT) was largely an “infor-
mation war,” waged as much against the American people as
“the enemy.” Some 80% of media reports leading up to the
Iraq war were mis- or disinformation. In the United Kingdom,
the Ministry of Defence engaged a private firm to assess how
successful the embedding of some 700 journalists with coa-
lition forces had worked to manipulate coverage of the Iraq
war. According to the results of the exercise, “analysis of the
print output . . . produced during the combat phase show[ed]
that 90% of embedded correspondents’ reporting was either
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positive or neutral” (Miller 2003; U.K. Ministry of Defence
2003). In the United States, the government gave contracts
worth millions of dollars to private contractors, such as the
Lincoln and Rendon Groups, to plant, fabricate, or buy news
stories favorable to U.S. interests in what was nothing less
than a secret propaganda war. In 2005, the Lincoln Group
admitted to having planted more than 1,000 articles in the
Iraqi and Arab press. The Rendon Group is still hard at it,
screening journalists seeking to accompany U.S. forces in Af-
ghanistan. As Henry Giroux (2009) remarked of the Bush
administration, “when the government wasn’t lying to pro-
mote dangerous policies, it willfully produced and circulated
fake news reports in order to provide the illusion that the lies
and the policies that flowed from them were supported by
selective members of the media and the larger public.” In my
own field, all but some 100 of an estimated 6,000 articles and
reports on the GWOT in the Sahara-Sahel are based on dis-
information. Such disinformation is not restricted to jour-
nalism; it has spread like a contagion into academe.
Journalists might argue that they are not party to this “in-
formation war,” that it is the work of government, their media
bosses, and the likes of the Lincoln and Rendon Groups.
Nevertheless, it is the sloppy “cut-and-paste” culture of con-
temporary journalism (and much of academe) and the failure
to check the facts that enables such disinformation, once
placed in the system, to run and run.
The above remarks take me to both the importance of
engaged (and “public”) anthropology, especially in the context
of studies of national crises that are or have been the subject
of intense media focus, and Werbner’s question of why we
should continue to study the local. Anthropologists, she says,
have a unique capacity to comment on the aftermath and
consequences of terror through intimate ethnographic work
on such things as the memory of violence and the politics of
memory; the myths and ideologies of the perpetrators of vi-
olence; bearing witness and the study of truth commissions
and human rights organizations. Our work in these areas is
critical in helping to defeat the “lie” that is so often, for the
reason outlined above, the prevailing (usually Western) ex-
plication of such situations and events. Our ability to study
what Werbner calls “the long or medium dure´e,” often in
places where other anthropologists, let alone journalists, have
not set foot, not only enables us but obligates us to “bear
witness.” We may be one voice against an empire, but it is
likely, in the long run, to be the one that counts. And, as
Werbner emphasizes, as the Islamic crisis becomes “the long
dure´e,” it is anthropologists more than journalists or other
social scientists who can give the “true” accounts of the impact
of the so-called GWOT on the stigmatization of Muslims.
Werbner’s reference to the scandal of the ESRC’s abrogation
of its own ethical standards raises a number of awkward ques-
tions. Under pressure from the U.K. government, the ESRC
ignored the advice of the anthropological community and, in
an act of hubris, dished out more than £2 million to improperly
peer-reviewed projects. Given that some of these had all the
appearance of slush funding and inadequate scholarship, there
is the question of whether their final reports will be subjected
to proper peer review or simply swept under the carpet.
Do anthropologists, as Werbner asks, have a duty to “speak
out” on public affairs that affect the communities they have
studied? The answer is most emphatically yes. Anthropologists
are often the only outside witnesses to appalling events and
situations. In a world in which truth, to borrow Giroux’s words,
“is not merely misrepresented or falsified, but overtly mocked,”
it is our task as anthropologists and writers, and as Solzhenitsyn
(1973) directed us, “to defeat the lie.”
Stephen M. Lyon
Department of Anthropology, Dawson Building, Durham
University, Durham DH1 3LE, United Kingdom (s.m.lyon@
durham.ac.uk). 27 IX 09
It is interesting that Pnina Werbner raises the difficulties of
providing something approaching an anthropological com-
ment on topical political events. She has, of course, done just
that over recent years with comments on various aspects of
Pakistani migrant integration (or not) within a pluralist Brit-
ish context (see, e.g., Werbner 2002b). I have always respected
and enjoyed her comments on these and other timely matters
and did not imagine that she saw any real problem in ex-
pressing views that were more akin to editorial comment than
scholarly analysis. It is useful to see that it is not the expression
of bias or personal opinion that gives her pause but rather,
in true academic style, the lack of credible evidence upon
which that bias is formed. In those cases where she has com-
mented, she has done so from a solid base (be it issues of
marriage arrangements, attitudes towards British multicul-
turalism, or immigration law). I applaud this contribution,
though I fear that the problem may lay precisely in this issue
of credible expertise, which most anthropologists lack. What
most anthropologists can say is largely unfit for the questions
being asked in the sorts of circumstances Werbner describes
here. Unless we set out to produce data that is relevant to
such questions, the sorts of topics we can clarify are not linked
to extraordinary events of atypical behaviors. Consequently,
I do not feel any obligation to comment, as an anthropologist,
on most of the public affairs that affect the communities in
which I have worked. I provide the sort of background con-
textual analysis of situations which might be of use. I have
provided expert opinions in legal cases where I have been
asked to comment on some aspect of Pakistani culture that
is being cited by the defense or the prosecution as a significant
factor in the decision making of the defendant, but I have
no knowledge of the defendant’s guilt or innocence. My public
engagement is therefore entirely detached from the affected
people. It is not my anthropological opinion in those specific
cases that is needed but rather my anthropological analysis
of evidence that I know to be true and that may bear some
similarity to the evidence in those cases. In other words, an-
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thropology does not confer any magical properties on any of
us when we go outside our areas of expertise.
It does not follow, however, that anthropologists can never
be useful analysts in circumstances where we cannot carry
out the usual research methods. Pnina Werbner may or may
not have met anyone who was intent on carrying out political
violence (under the umbrella of Islam or any other belief
system), but I am sure that she could have known about such
people had she so desired. The recent work of Scott Atran
on jihadi groups does engage with the very short-term sched-
ules required by journalism (or nearly) and manages to gen-
erate useful analyses on the social organization and com-
munication networks of men engaged in political violence
classified as terrorism (see Atran 2008 for the transcript of
his testimony before the U.S. Congress). Atran has done an
interesting job of combining data production methods that
most anthropologists would find dissatisfying, to say the least
(interviewing jihadis in prisons among other things), with
theoretical and analytical tools that are part of the diverse
stock in trade of anthropologists. His insights are timely and
useful and delivered with none of the critical self-reflection
present in Werbner’s very well-written and admirable piece.
To some extent, this merely illustrates Werbner’s point. We
are constrained from producing data in many, though not all,
of our usual ways (hanging out and taking an active part in
the important activities of our informants/friends), however,
we are still able to analyze whatever data is on offer in our
usual ways. For anthropologists who have little to no expe-
rience in doing more than treating ethnography as a form of
literary criticism, it may be that they have nothing to con-
tribute to the debates on such public events. But there are
those who have a slightly more performant battery of ana-
lytical tools, and while I continue to share Werbner’s general
concern about such anthropological engagement, I neverthe-
less accept that it can be convincingly anthropological.
Jonathan Spencer
Social Anthropology, University of Edinburgh, 5.02
Chrystal Macmillan Building, 15a George Square,
Edinburgh EH8 9LD, United Kingdom (jonathan
.spencer@ed.ac.uk). 27 X 09
Pnina Werbner has written a thoughtful and provocative re-
flection on what it means to be an anthropological expert in
troubled times. What stands out above all in this piece is
Werbner’s sensible refusal to claim special insights into pro-
cesses that she herself finds difficult to understand. Werbner’s
claims to expertise are grounded in years of work with a small
group of British Muslims in South Manchester. Like other
British Muslims since the 9/11 attacks and the July 2005 Lon-
don bombings, they have been the subject of all manner of
scrutiny from the media, from politicians, from the intelli-
gence services, and, presumably, from their neighbors in
South Manchester. Meanwhile, the official sponsors of much
anthropological research in Britain have tried to “sell” social
scientists to government as useful sources of insight into a
mysterious process they choose to call “radicalization.”
I can offer two comments, each based on firsthand expe-
rience of issues touched on in Werbner’s piece. During the
first 6 months of 2009, as the 30-year civil war in Sri Lanka
built to its final dreadful conclusion, I was called quite fre-
quently by journalists looking for a quick quote on the sit-
uation that was developing in the north of the country. The
government had long since denied local and foreign jour-
nalists access to the war zone, and both sides tried to milk
the situation for propaganda purposes. The government pre-
sented itself as authors of a “humanitarian intervention” to
liberate civilian “hostages” from their “terrorist” captors.
Tamil secessionists, and especially their supporters in the ex-
tensive Tamil diaspora in Europe, Australia, and North Amer-
ica, described what was happening as “genocide.” Much of
the time the most useful comment I could offer was a simple
warning that whatever was actually happening in the north,
it was almost certainly not what was being claimed by the
propagandists on both sides. Now that the dust is settling,
like many others concerned with the situation there, I spend
my time piecing together partial truths about what has hap-
pened by triangulating across the best journalists’ Web sites,
like the excellent Groundviews, run from Colombo, Sri Lanka,
or the equally valuable TransCurrents that operates from To-
ronto.43 If I want the best-quality information on a particular
event—such as who really murdered the 17 aid workers killed
in the town of Muttur in 2006—I go to the extraordinary
work of the University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna),
which is also available on the Web.44 Yet the fastidious work
of an organization like University Teachers for Human Rights
(Jaffna) goes completely unmentioned in recent high-profile
anthropological work on the war (e.g., Trawick 2007). Some
anthropologists working in Sri Lanka have indeed presented
themselves, in Werbner’s words, as the “lone voice docu-
menting . . . events for a wider audience.” But almost all such
recent work, in my experience, is less accurate, and much less
carefully researched and presented, than the best efforts of
local journalists and human rights activists. Against this back-
ground, I find the call for disciplinary humility refreshing and
necessary.
My other observation concerns the controversy about the
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)’s ill-fated joint
project with the U.K. Foreign Office on “Combating Radi-
calisation.” In the last 10 years in Britain and across Europe,
there has been a wave of genuinely excellent research by an-
thropologists and others on the extraordinary waves of
change, reform, and counter-reform in patterns of local Islam.
Much of this work challenges stereotypes and forces the reader
to take a complex and more nuanced view, both of Islamic
reform and of the political movements labeled as “Islamist”
43. http://www.groundviews.org; http://www.transcurrents.com.
44. http://www.uthr.org/.
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(as well as Werbner’s own earlier work; see, e.g., Ahmad 2009;
Marsden 2005; Osella and Osella 2008; Simpson and Kresse
2008; Soares and Osella 2009). From my own semi-insider
role in the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC)
process, two things are clear. This was what not the kind of
evidence the sponsors of the program were looking for. As
the original program specification made clear, the policy-
makers “knew” what the problem was and they “knew” quite
a lot about how and where it could be found; what they
needed researchers for was simply, as it were, to provide the
names and addresses of the usual Islamist suspects. And al-
though the program has indeed run and apparently has been
deemed a great success by its paymasters, the researchers who
know most about the topics under investigation have kept
well clear; in the commissioning process, the ESRC had to
turn to nonacademic research bodies for key studies of Europe
and South Asia, while the best academic researchers were
quietly boycotting the whole thing. Again, sometimes dis-
engagement is the dignified ethical stance.
Peter van der Veer
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic
Diversity, Hermann Fogeweg 11, D-37073 Go¨ttingen,
Germany (vanderveer@mmg.mpg.de). 15 IX 09
Pnina Werbner raises a number of interesting questions in
her article while failing to give clear answers to them or to
suggest a promising framework in which we might address
them. The main question seems to be how ethnography of
the quotidian in particular field sites may help us to under-
stand global terrorism. Before we can answer that question,
we need to address a preliminary question, namely, how an-
thropologists should deal with the demands from the state
and from the public to comment or do research on issues of
national security. These are, in my view, perennial questions
from the beginning of the modern study of society. Let me
give one early example. Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje
(1857–1936) was paid by the Dutch Ministry of the Colonies
to go to Arabia and find out about pilgrims from Aceh in
Mecca. He stayed in Mecca in 1884–1885 and came in close
touch with these pilgrims. In 1891–1892 Snouck stayed in
Aceh as an advisor of the colonial government. His analysis
of local society was used in 1898 in the bloodiest military
expedition of the Dutch in the Indies, the war in Aceh that
left 60,000 to 70,000 dead in a population of about 500,000.
Snouck’s work was excellent in scholarly terms and has been
used until today in anthropological work on Aceh, but it is
also a good example of what we would call today “counter-
terrorism,” especially since “Pan-Islamism,” the term used in
the colonial period, looks so much like “global Islamic mil-
itancy” today. Other, more recent examples would be Ruth
Benedict’s work on Japanese culture in World War II, Project
Camelot in the 1960s, and the current attempts to use an-
thropology for the Human Terrain System, a form of intel-
ligence gathering for military purposes (see Gonza´lez 2009).
Is September 11, 2001, such a watershed that this longer his-
tory cannot inform us? I think this is only the case if one
does not only do anthropology “at home” but also firmly
locates oneself “at home” in the West. The perception of
“global terror” is quite different from place to place and there-
fore also the perception of the role of social science is quite
different if one’s home is not that of the Home Office (van
der Veer and Munshi 2004). The question today, as in the
past, is how much anthropologists should become an instru-
ment of state policy, and in Britain, anthropologists have given
a clear answer to that question. Werbner discusses the British
debate but does not make her own position clear. Her problem
is not so much whether anthropology should be used by the
state but rather how valid anthropological knowledge is for
understanding global terrorism. She doubts that validity in
terms of what I would call counterinsurgency, but what she
does not mention is the importance of anthropology as an
intellectual pursuit for the theoretical understanding of se-
crecy in relation to what is public and what is publicity. An-
thropologists have been working on secret societies, on public
spheres, and on media and mediation, and it seems to me
that this kind of theoretical work is important for our un-
derstanding of how global businesses work, how the global
financial market works, and how global terrorism works (De-
vji 2005). This is not precisely counterinsurgency but a valid
contribution of our knowledge of today’s world. Finally, an-
thropologists have to respond to the demand of the public
to be informed about the world. Given the nature of media-
scapes this is not an easy task, but it is unavoidable. However,
besides participating in public debate on the basis of one’s
general knowledge about religion or Islam, for instance (which
is different from special knowledge about specific terrorists
and so on), one also has the task to analyze the nature of
public debate and the relation between public opinion and
state policy. It is thus perhaps more important “at home” to
study the ways in which the media construct debates by giving
some people a voice while denying it to others (van der Veer
2006). By emphasizing the Weberian analysis of charisma, one
may fail to understand the production of images and the
nature of mediation.
Reply
These are very troubled, anxious times for Pakistanis at home
and abroad. The war in Afghanistan has spilled over into
Pakistani cities, into the very heart of Islamabad, Rawalpindi,
and Lahore, and into the North-West Frontier Province, with
almost daily suicide bombings in Peshawar. As I write, a full-
scale civil war is being waged, moving from Swat to South
Wazirastan. Soldiers and civilians are killed daily, and hun-
dreds of thousands of civilians have been displaced and are
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living in makeshift camps. My more fortunate Pakistani
friends in Lahore and Islamabad have travelled on philan-
thropic missions to Swat with food, clothing, and bedding
and to offer medical care for the displaced. Kohat, the garrison
town located nearby the Sufi lodge I studied, Ghamkol Sharif,
was recently the site of a suicide bombing. It seems quite
possible that the urs festival will not be held at the lodge this
year.
For the past 20 years since the Rushdie affair broke out,
Pakistanis in the diaspora have had to live, at least in their
political imaginaries, global lives. Since 9/11 their sense of
being under surveillance has intensified, along with the an-
tagonism felt for the West, despite the fact that many have
prospered economically. In Pakistan there may not have been
one single cataclysmic event, as van der Veer comments
rightly, but regional conflicts, military rule, endemic violence,
struggles for democracy, and most recently, the rise of the
Pakistani Taliban, have left the population deeply troubled.
Conspiracy theories abound, and lack of trust typifies much
of public life.
I mention this background in advance of my detailed re-
sponse because it seems to me that as an anthropologist, one
can no longer write about the daily lives of Pakistani subjects
or their religious ideas and organizations without addressing
participants’ experiences as they respond to these conflicts.
Yet this is precisely what two recent anthropological collec-
tions on politics and Islam in South Asia and the Muslim
world achieve. With a brief nod to 9/11 in their introductions,
the articles in the two special issues, though excellent in their
detailed scholarship as Spencer points out (see Osella and
Osella 2008; Soares and Osella 2009), nevertheless convey the
sense that anthropologists are living in a bubble in which
geopolitical conflicts do not register or even exist.
We are faced with a disjunction between public anthro-
pologists who comment on global crises such as 9/11 or the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, often without any reference to
contemporary scholarship about the Muslim societies most
affected (in some cases recent anthropological research is sim-
ply absent, as in Iraq under Saddam Hussein), and anthro-
pologists who fail to convey in their studies the urgency of
local people’s voices as they struggle to understand the con-
flicts swirling around them. Instead, an analysis of Muslim
reform movements or customary veiling and piety seem to
substitute obliquely for direct engagement.
Thinking about what I can say in reply to the thoughtful
and, may I say, gentle responses of the CA commentators to
my paper, it seems evident, then, that I should start by rec-
ognizing that public anthropology at this historical moment
is not just an option—it is an imperative for anyone claiming
to study the people of this troubled region and its scattered
diaspora. And it is to the great merit of all the CA respondents
to my article that in their own work as anthropologists and
ethnographers, they have attempted to speak to the times—
whether of terror, extreme nationalism, religious zealotry, or
Islamophobia. Perhaps—though this goes against the central
message of my paper—it needs to be admitted that sometimes
one has to speak out on current events despite doubts about
one’s capacity to fully command the whole field and complex
facts at stake.
My paper has considered the methodological and ethical
disjunctions inherent in writing about Pakistanis at a time of
terror: first, the disjunction between social formations studied
at one point in time and events taking place at another point
in time; second, between socialities studied in one place and
events taking place in another; and finally, the disjunctions
between the seen and the unseen, the ordinary and the ex-
traordinary. These untheorized leaps in time and space, which
allow us to comment on current affairs, involve an intellectual
act of generalization underpinned by essentialist assumptions
about continuity. To bridge the time/space gap, public an-
thropologists of the current global crisis must rely on the
media for basic facts about the here and now. Both these
gestures—of generalization from scholarship at another time
and place and heavy reliance on the media—were evident in
a 2008 American Anthropological Association panel debating
the war in Iraq. With the exception of William Beeman, one
of the CA respondents here, none of the other speakers were
regional experts, and the data on contemporary Iraqi society
was notable by its absence; in its place were demographic
realities mapped in nineteenth-century colonial Iraq and du-
bious figures about casualties. Much of the immediate re-
sponse to 9/11—and not only by anthropologists—reflected
the same sort of disjunctions in time and space and the same
absence of reference to directly relevant expert regional an-
thropological knowledge. It is as though when it comes to
the current confrontation with Muslim societies, anthropo-
logical research is deemed irrelevant even to public anthro-
pologists themselves. In Talal Asad’s book on suicide, there
is one minor reference to an anthropologist (Mary Douglas),
and this is not untypical.
For the remainder of this reply, I want to respond briefly
to the specific comments on my paper. I begin with Masooda
Banu who argues, generously, that Islamic terror within Mus-
lim societies can be understood by drawing on anthropolog-
ical field notes from a multitude of small places in order to
explain the “forces leading to popularization of radical views”
and the social segments most likely to respond to the call of
radical groups. There is, however, an unspoken disjunction
in this reading: the discourses of many different—and op-
posed—diasporic Pakistani groups, I found, all share a rather
similar radical and, on the surface, shockingly incendiary lan-
guage. Over time, however, I came to realize that such emo-
tionally charged oratory substituted for action (P. Werbner
2004). Radical rhetoric and political views, in other words,
in no way explains the move from emotion to action—which
is precisely what the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and
Economic and Social Research Council want to understand.
My research certainly did not lead me to anticipate the in-
volvement of young diaspora Pakistanis in suicide bombing
plots.
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Peter van der Veer suggests in this regard that perhaps the
real need is to study secrecy. Against that, Hefner’s encounter
with an Indonesian Islamist indicates that Muslims are not
afraid to speak truth to power. This outspokenness has been
true in Britain, at least until the passing of a recent law on
incitement to religious hatred. Both local and national British
Muslim leaders do not hide behind a mask of secrecy. Their
open condemnation of the West is what makes fear of Mus-
lims, Islamophobia, qualitatively different from anti-Semitism
or antiblack racism (see Werbner 2005a). Of course, Pakistanis
who engage in illegal activities (tax avoidance and other white
collar or petty criminal activities) are as secretive as any other
Briton, but when it comes to political opinions, Pakistanis
are not afraid to speak out. Some will express their views to
interlocutors like Maqsooda Banu, who they believe can pub-
licize them, but this is certainly not true when it comes to
anthropologists like myself who have little access to the public
media and who study more informal, less controlled settings.
In this regard, Hefner’s encounter with his Islamist friend
is instructive in another way as well: it highlights the element
of surprise, the unexpected, that makes fieldwork qualitatively
different from armchair anthropology. His friend responded
to the Bali bombings cynically with the words “those Western
tourists were all going to hell anyway,” but this apparently
unfeeling response raises several significant questions. Were
his comments to be taken literally, at face value? Do they
point to the tragic ambivalence of the Islamist struggle? Or
do they merely reflect a desire to shock an insider/outsider?
As with the wink immortalized by Geertz, following Alfred
Schuts, only intimate knowledge can tell what such statements
are meant to convey.
I agree that there is great strength in comparative anthro-
pology. Who would deny the monumental achievements of
Claude Levi-Strauss, Marcel Mauss, or of more recent scholars
such as Marilyn Strathern and Marshall Sahlins? Indeed, I was
myself surprised in writing and rewriting this article at how
much of value could be gleaned by looking comparatively at
different studies of Islamism (returning to Bano’s point). But
what saddens me about most commentaries post-9/11 is how
little in fact they draw on anthropological fieldwork in their
attempts to analyze such global confrontations critically in
public. I do agree with Hefner and others that it is imperative
to speak out against Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” the-
sis, popularized in the media and among political leaders. The
challenge nevertheless must be that of not sounding merely
apologist but recognizing that Muslims in the diaspora and
Pakistan are often passionately hostile to Western policies in
the Middle East and the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan,
that most do not believe that 9/11 was the work of Muslims,
and that most do not regard the Taliban as a terrifying threat
but, rather, the invention of the United States or India. This
is not to construct an orientalist image—conspiracy theories
proliferate not only in Pakistan but in the United States too
(Fenster 1999; Knight 2000; Parish and Martin 2001). Mus-
lims have a right to protest publicly against national policies
they perceive to be unjust or dangerous. Their concerns are
legitimate, founded on their own positioned understanding
of events, right or wrong.
I think it is perfectly legitimate to argue, with Kapferer,
Hefner, Beeman, Keenan, and Gonza´lez, that anthropologists
must take a critical view of media constructions of events
such as 9/11. This is okay as long as critics make clear the
grounds from which they speak. If they write as concerned
citizens against the American “Leviathan” on the pages of
anthropological journals, they do not inevitably speak as an-
thropological experts. If they write for the public press, they
may be speaking as informed orientalists, not firsthand an-
thropological observers, though close familiarity based on ear-
lier research can certainly sensitize anthropologists to glaring
distortions in media representations. Public anthropologists
must take care not to cheapen the distinctive anthropological
cache of intimate, beneath-the-surface knowledge by claiming
the aura of an expert—especially when anthropological
knowledge is evidently lacking and when they are treading
into a veritable ocean of expert opinion.
What constitutes expert knowledge, and how does it con-
tribute to our capacity as anthropologists to comment on the
conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia? I agree with
Bowen and Gonza´lez that we need to be meticulous in the
terminology we use. Hizb-ut-Tahrir, for example, may be “ji-
hadist” without espousing personal martyrdom. I know, how-
ever, from the personal experience of Keele colleagues and
students, that the group does not welcome researchers and
puts itself beyond the state and mainstream Muslim diaspora,
refusing, for example, to join antiwar demonstrations in Brit-
ain. Attran and Sageman’s argument that those seeking mar-
tyrdom are just a bunch of guys recruited through friendship
and kinship networks is very instructive, complementing post
facto identikit studies of suicide bombers. But their studies
raise the question of whether such cliques of conspirators can
best be understood in terms of “culture,” broadly speaking,
rather than “youth culture,” “deviance,” or idiosyncratic per-
sonal circumstances? Could we learn more about them, for
example, by studying the Red Brigades than the “culture” of
diasporic Pakistanis? It seems to me that too much evidence
has emerged by now of youngsters’ active recruitment by more
mature actors and their attendance at Pakistani training
camps for this to be true in any simple way. But the further
question remains: are these findings about recruitment pat-
terns relevant, and in what sense, to public anthropologists’
capacity to challenge Islamophobic stereotypes?
I have to accept, because all the American respondents to
my article stress this, that American journalism has demon-
ized Muslims more stridently and allowed more media space
to propagandist supporters of the wars in Iraq and Afghan-
istan than the British broadsheet press and media have,
though the American media have also sought out the voices
of moderate Muslim leaders and spokespersons (Leonard
2003:23–24). There also appear to have been fewer home-
grown conspiracies by American-born young Muslims than
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in Britain. In so far as the United Kingdom is concerned, I
do not accept the simplistic claim of many scholars, including
anthropologists, that the press has been biased against Mus-
lims in any straightforward way, though it is true that they
have claimed the right to investigate the rhetoric within
mosques and the ideologies of some organizations. My own
reading of the British press tends to confirm Iain Edgar’s view
of the excellence of much reporting by Middle East and South
Asian journalists, both indigenous and foreign, who are far
better placed than anthropologists to gain access to the facts
on the ground. How one uses this material remains the ques-
tion. Edgar’s own study of Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders’
dreams is one of the most original, truly anthropological con-
tributions to the understanding of these movements.
Gonza´lez cites the outspokenness of Max Gluckman and
Eric Wolf, representatives of a previous generation of an-
thropologists, who criticized colonialism and imperialism, as
well as contemporary anthropologists Jeff Halper, Paul Far-
mer, and Catherine Lutz. With the exception of Mamdani,
who in an article in the London Review of Books unforgivably
exonerates Robert Mugabe and his murderous regime, I have
nothing but admiration for the courageous activism of many
anthropologists who, in different parts of the world, represent
the suffering of ordinary people. Jeff Halper, for example,
undoubtedly speaks out as an activist, a public intellectual,
and an anthropologist on the basis of intimate knowledge of
human rights violations and Palestinian persecution under
Israeli occupation.
There is also little doubt that, in a repeat of the Great Game,
American, Soviet, Saudi, and Iranian interference in the in-
ternal affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan, along with the
struggle with India over Kashmir and the ruthlessness, men-
dacity, and irresponsibility of postcolonial elites, have com-
bined to bring about the emergence of the Taliban and Al-
Qaeda. This is not a simple instance of an Islamic revivalist
movement of the type arising periodically in the Muslim
world, described for North Africa by Gellner and Geertz fol-
lowing Ibn Khaldoun. These new Islamic movements have
been seeded by global forces and international money. At the
geopolitical level the facts are known, and I have often heard
them recited not only by regional scholars but by local Pak-
istanis at home and in the diaspora who blame the United
States, the Saudis, the Russians, the Iranians, the Israelis, the
Indians, the British (particularly for Kashmir), and their own
political leaders for their current predicaments. What to do
about it and how anthropologists are to represent these con-
flicts to Western audiences nevertheless remains problematic,
especially since we are rarely experts on the Occident, the
stamping ground of other disciplines.
Keenan and Lyon both study local-level politics. In
Keenan’s case, this has produced revelations about American
conspiracy that affect the Tuareg, the people he has studied
for many decades. He is the kind of public anthropologist
who speaks from personal knowledge. Recent media revela-
tions about American and British extraordinary renditions
and complicity in torture point to a world of hidden con-
spiracies. Lyon’s study of village Punjabi politics (Lyon 2004),
like other recent monographs on Pakistan, highlights the im-
portant fact that most of the time local-level leaders try to
avoid real violence even while violence remains a threatened
option. It is certainly worth reflecting on such studies in the
light of the outbreak of widespread violence and civil war in
Pakistan.
We need, as van der Veer points out, to be aware of the
repercussions of the knowledge we gather and whether it is
open to abuse. Nevertheless, as Spencer points out, much
fine-grained anthropological knowledge is of little use to the
British government concerned to manage events in South Asia
and the diaspora. The problem often faced by public anthro-
pologists like Keenan, however, is the opposite one: how to
call attention and convince the world of the victimization of
ordinary people where access has not been denied to the an-
thropologist, as it is in Sri Lanka or Iraq during the present
troubles, or where anthropologists are not perceived as dan-
gerous outsiders, as in some parts of Pakistan and Afghani-
stan. When access is denied, it is evident that local human
rights groups—and local journalists—are often far better
placed to gather information about such atrocities. We as
anthropologists must learn to respect these sources of knowl-
edge. But above all, we must keep reminding ourselves that
judging between media-sourced findings is not our area of
expertise and that the knowledge it produces differs from the
intimate knowledge gained through close ethnographic re-
search. A postgraduate Danish-Pakistani student of mine cur-
rently researching the madrassa of women supporters of the
Red Mosque movement in Islamabad was shocked, for ex-
ample, by an article on the Red Mosque published in Public
Culture by a recognized South Asianist. I bring this as an
example to point in conclusion once again to the disjunctions
of time, space, and knowledge outlined in this article. In the
absence of primary research, only careful and systemic scru-
tiny of all the relevant sources, an exercise ironically often
achievable only after the crisis has passed, can justify in my
view our public interventions as anthropological experts in a
saturated field of opinion makers.
—Pnina Werbner
References Cited
Abbas, Tahir, ed. 2005. Muslim Britain: communities under pressure.
London: Zed.
Abou Zahab, Mariam, and Olivier Roy. 2004. Islamist networks: the
Afghan-Pakistan connection. London: Hurst.
Abu-Lughod, Lila. 2002. Do Muslim women really need saving? an-
thropological reflections on cultural relativism and its Others. In
Ethics forum: September 11 and ethnographic responsibility. Special
issue, American Anthropologist 104(3):783–790.
Ahmad, I. 2009. Islamism and democracy in India: the transformation
of Jamaat-e-Islami. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. [JS]
Ahmed, Akbar. 2007. Journey into Islam. Washington, DC: Brookings
Institute.
This content downloaded from 129.215.19.193 on Wed, 22 Jan 2014 08:28:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Werbner Anthropological Blues in the Face of Global Terror 219
Ahmed, Akbar S., and Chris N. Shore. 1995. Introduction: is an-
thropology relevant in the contemporary world? In The future of
anthropology: its relevance to the contemporary world. Akbar Ahmed
and Chris Shore, eds. Pp. 12–45. London: Athelone.
Ahmed, Nafeezz Mosaddeq. 2005. The war on truth: 9/11, disinfor-
mation, and the anatomy of terrorism. Adlestrop, U.K.: Arris.
Al-Rasheed, Madawi. 2007. Contesting the Saudi state: Islamic voices
from a new generation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Anson, Robert Sam. 2002. The journalist and the terrorist (Daniel
Pearl and Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh). Vanity Fair, August. http:
//s3.amazonaws.com/911timeline/2002/vanityfair0802.html.
Arditti, Rita. 1999. Searching for life: the grandmothers of the Plaza
de Mayo and the disappeared children of Argentina. Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press.
Aretxaga, Begona. 1997. Shattering silence: women, nationalism, and
political subjectivity in Northern Ireland. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Asad, Talal, ed. 1973. Anthropology and the colonial encounter. New
York: Humanity.
———. 1991. Afterword: from the history of colonial anthropology
to the anthropology of Western hegemony. In Colonial situations:
essays on the contextualization of ethnographic knowledge. George
W. Stocking, ed. Pp. 314–324. Madison: University of Wisconsin
Press.
———. 2007. On suicide bombing. New York: Columbia University
Press.
Atran, Scott. 2008. The making of a terrorist: a need for understand-
ing the field. Testimony before the U.S. House Appropriations
Subcommittee on Homeland Security, March 12, http://
sitemaker.umich.edu/satran/files/atran_congress_12march08.pdf.
Bagguley, Paul, and Yasmin Hussain. 2008. Riotous citizens: ethnic
conflict in multicultural Britain. Aldershot, U.K.: Gower.
Baty, Phil. 2006. Life-risking “spy” plan pulled. Times Higher Edu-
cation, October 20.
Beeman, William O. 1983. Images of the great Satan: representations
of the United States in the Iranian revolution. In Religion and
politics in Iran. N. R. Keddie, ed. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press.
———. 1986a. Conflict and belief in American foreign policy. In
Peace and war: cross-cultural perspectives. Mary LeCron Foster and
Robert A. Rubenstein, eds. Pp. 333–342. New Brunswick, NJ:
Transaction. [WOB]
———. 1986b. Stricter penalties will not eliminate terrorism. In
Terrorism: opposing viewpoints. Bonnie Szumski, ed. Pp. 215–229.
St. Paul, MN: Greenhaven. [WOB]
———. 1986c. Terrorism: community based or state supported?
Arab-American Affairs 16(spring):29–36. [WOB]
———. 1987. Anthropology and the print media. Anthropology To-
day 3(3):2–4. [WOB]
———. 2001. Writing for the crisis. Anthropology Today 17(6):1–2.
[WOB]
———. 2004 [2001]. A war our great-grandchildren will be fighting:
understanding Osama bin Laden. In Anthropologists in the public
sphere: speaking out on war, peace, and American power. Roberto
J. Gonza´lez, ed. Austin: University of Texas Press. (Reprinted from
Pacific News Service September 14, 2001.)
———. 2005. The “Great Satan” vs. the “Mad Mullahs”: how the
United States and Iran demonize each other. Westport, CT: Green-
wood/Praeger. [WOB]
———. 2008. The “Great Satan” vs. the “Mad Mullahs”: how the
United States and Iran demonize each other. Paperback edition,
updated with new preface. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
[WOB]
Begg, Moazzam. 2006. Enemy combatant: the terrifying true story of
a Briton in Guantanamo. London: Free Press.
Besteman, Catherine, and Gusterson, Hugh, eds. 2005. Why America’s
top pundits are wrong: anthropologists talk back. Berkeley: University
of California Press. [RJG]
Bowen, John R. 2007. Why the French don’t like headscarves: Islam,
the state, and public space. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Burke, Jason. 2008. Dispatches: the jihadist next door. Observer Mag-
azine, January 20.
Calhoun, Craig, Paul Price, and Ashley Timmer, eds. 2002. Under-
standing September 11. New York: New Press.
Chatterji, Roma, and Deepak Mehta. 2007. Living with violence: an
anthropology of events and everyday life. New Delhi: Routledge.
Das, Veena. 1990. Our work to cry, your work to listen. In Mirrors
of violence: communities, riots and survivors in South Asia. Veena
Das, ed. Pp. 345–394. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Davis, Wade. 2002. For a global declaration of interdependence. In-
ternational Herald Tribune, July 6. [RJG]
Der Spiegel Online International. 2006. The cartoon Jihad: Satanic
Verses taught us a lesson. Der Spiegel Online International, February
7, http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,399459,00.html (ac-
cessed December 21, 2009).
Devji, Faisal. 2005. Landscapes of the jihad: militancy, morality, mo-
dernity. Crises in World Politics Series. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Uni-
versity Press.
Edgar, Iain R. 2004. A war of dreams? militant Muslim dreaming in
the context of traditional and contemporary Islamic dream theory
and practice. Dreaming 14(1):21–29.
———. 2006. The “true dream” in contemporary Islamic/jihadist
dreamwork: a case study of the dreams of Taliban leader Mullah
Omar. Contemporary South Asia 15(3):263–272.
———. 2007. The inspirational night dream in the motivation and
justification of Jihad. Nova Religio 11(2):59–76.
———. 2008. Overtures of paradise: night dreams and Islamic ji-
hadist militancy. Curare: Journal of Medical Anthropology 31(1):
87–97.
Eriksen, Thomas Hylland. 2005. Engaging anthropology: the case for
a public presence. Oxford: Berg.
Ewing, Katherine P. 2008. Stolen honor: stigmatizing Muslim men in
Berlin. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Farmer, Paul. 2005. Pathologies of power. Berkeley: University of Cal-
ifornia Press. [RJG]
Feldman, Allen. 1991. Formations of violence: the narrative of the body
and political terror in Northern Ireland. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Fenster, Mark. 1999. Conspiracy theory: secrecy and power in American
culture. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Fischer, Michael M. J. 1980. Iran: from religious dispute to revolution.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Fischer, Michael M. J., and Mehdi Abedi. 1990. Debating Muslims:
cultural dialogues in postmodernity and tradition. Madison: Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Press.
Fisk, Robert. 2009. The age of the warrior: selected writings. New York:
Harper Perennial. [IRE]
Fox, Richard G. 1996. Editorial: going public with anthropology. In
Anthropology in Public. Special issue, Current Anthropology
37(suppl.):nil5.
Geertz, Clifford. 1985. Waddling in. Times Literary Supplement, June
7.
Gillespie, Marie. 2006. Transnational television audiences after Sep-
tember 11. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 32(6):903–923.
Giroux, Henry A. 2009. The politics of lying and the culture of deceit
in Obama’s America: the rule of damaged politics. Truthout/Per-
spective, September 21, http://www.truthout.org/092109R. [JK]
Gonza´lez, Roberto J. 2004. Introduction. In Anthropologists in the
public sphere: speaking out on war, peace, and American power.
Roberto J. Gonza´lez, ed. Pp. 1–20. Austin: University of Texas
Press.
This content downloaded from 129.215.19.193 on Wed, 22 Jan 2014 08:28:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
220 Current Anthropology Volume 51, Number 2, April 2010
———. 2007a. Phoenix reborn? the rise of the “human terrain sys-
tem.” Anthropology Today 23(6):21–22.
———. 2007b. Towards mercenary anthropology? the new US Army
counterinsurgency manual FM 3–24 and the military-anthropol-
ogy complex. Anthropology Today 23(3):14–19.
———. 2009. American counterinsurgency: human science and the
human terrain. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. [PV]
Gusterson, Hugh. 2003. Anthropology and the military—1968, 2003,
and beyond? Anthropology Today 19(3):25–26.
———. 2005. Anthropologists as spies. Anthropology Today 21(3):
25–26.
———. 2007. Anthropologists and war: a response to David Kilcullen
(AT 23[3]). Anthropology Today 23(4):23.
Halper, Jeff. 2008. An Israeli in Palestine. London: Pluto. [RJG]
Hannerz, Ulf. 1996. Transnational connections: culture, people, places.
London: Routledge.
———. 2004. Foreign news: exploring the world of foreign correspon-
dents. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hefner, Robert W. 2002. Global violence and Indonesian Muslim
politics. In “In Focus: September 11, 2001.” Special section, Amer-
ican Anthropologist 104(3):754–765.
Hershberg, Eric, and Kevin W. Moore, eds. 2002. Critical views of
September 11. New York: New Press.
HM Government. 2006. Report of the official account of the bombings
in London on 7th July 2005. May 11. HC 1087. London: Stationery
Office.
———. 2008. The Prevent Strategy: a guide for local partners in En-
gland stopping people becoming or supporting terrorists and violent
extremists. June 3. London: Stationery Office.
Husain, Ed. 2007. The Islamist: why I joined radical Islam in Britain,
what I saw inside and why I left. London: Penguin.
Hussain, Zahid. 2007. Frontline Pakistan: the struggle with militant
Islam. London: Penguin Viking.
Jarman, Neil. 1997. Material conflicts: parades and visual displays in
Northern Ireland. Oxford: Berg.
Kapferer, Bruce. 1988. Legends of people, myths of state. Washington,
DC: Smithsonian Institution.
———. 2002a. The new Leviathan and the crisis of criticism in the
social sciences. In Forum: the World Trade Center and global crisis:
some critical perspectives. Bruce Kapferer, ed. Special issue, Social
Analysis 46(1):148–152.
———, ed. 2002b. Forum: the World Trade Center and global crisis:
some critical perspectives. Special issue, Social Analysis 46(1):
148–152.
———. 2005. New formations of power, the oligarchic-corporate
state, and anthropological ideological discourse. Anthropological
Theory 5(3):285–299. [BK]
Keenan, Jeremy. 2006. Conspiracy theories and “terrorists”: how the
war on terror is placing new responsibilities on anthropology. An-
thropology Today 22(6):4–9.
———. 2009. The dark Sahara: America’s war on terror in Africa.
London: Pluto. Forthcoming.
———. Forthcoming. The dying Sahara: US imperialism and terror
in Africa. London: Pluto.
Khosrokhavar, Farhand. 2006. Quand Al-Qa¨ida parle: te´moignages
derrie`re les barreaux. Paris: Grasset & Fasquelle.
Kilcullen, David. 2007. Ethics, politics and nonstate warfare: a re-
sponse to Gonza´lez in this issue. Anthropology Today 23(3):20.
Knight, Peter. 2000. Conspiracy culture: from Kennedy to the X Files.
London: Routledge.
Lan, David. 1985. Guns and rain. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Leonard, Karen Isaksen. 2003. Muslims in the United States: the state
of research. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Lewis, Philip. 2007. Young, British and Muslim. London: Continuum.
Lutz, Catherine. 2001. Homefront. Boston: Beacon. [RJG]
Lyon, Stephen M. 2004. An anthropological analysis of local politics
and patronage in a Pakistani village. Lampeter, U.K.: Mellen.
MacClancy, Jeremy. 2002. Introduction: taking people seriously. In
Exotic no more: anthropology on the front lines. Jeremy MacClancy,
ed. Pp. 1–14. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Mahmood, Saba. 2005. Politics of piety: the Islamic revival and the
feminist subject. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Malik, Jamal. 1998. Colonisation of Islam. Delhi: Manohar.
Malik, Shiv. 2007. My brother the bomber (on Mohammad Sidique
Khan). Prospect, June.
Malkki, Liisa H. 1995. Purity and exile: violence, memory and national
cosmology among Hutu refugees in Tanzania. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press.
Mamdani, Mahmood. 2002. When victims become killers: colonialism,
nativism, and genocide in Rwanda. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press. [RJG]
———. 2007. The politics of naming: genocide, civil war, insurgency.
London Review of Books, March 8. [RJG]
Marsden, M. 2005. Living Islam: Muslim religious experience in Pak-
istan’s North-West Frontier. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. [JS]
Mascia-Lees, Fran, and Susan H. Lees, eds. 2002. “In Focus: Septem-
ber 11, 2001.” Special section, American Anthropologist 104(3):
754–765.
Metcalf, Barbara Daly. 2002. “Traditionalist” Islamic activism: Deo-
band, Tablighis, and Talibs. In Understanding September 11. Craig
Calhoun, Paul Price, and Ashley Timmer, eds. New York: New
Press.
Miller, D. 2003. Information dominance: the philosophy of total
propaganda control. http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/HL0312/
S00216.htm. [JK]
Mooney, James. 1991 [1896]. The Ghost-Dance religion and Wounded
Knee. New York: Dover. [RJG]
Muslim Weekly. 2009. Anti-terror raids raise community tension. Pp.
1, 2. Muslim Weekly, November 20.
Nader, Laura. 1969. Up the anthropologist: perspectives gained from
studying up. In Reinventing anthropology. Dell Hymes, ed. Pp.
284–311. New York: Pantheon. [RJG]
Nordstrom, Carolyn. 1997. A different kind of war story. Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press.
Osella, Fillipo, and Caroline Osella, eds. 2008. Islam in South Asia.
Special issue, Modern Asian Studies 42(2,3). [JS]
Parish, Jane, and Martin Parker, eds. 2001. The age of anxiety: con-
spiracy theory and the human sciences. Sociological Review Mono-
graphs. Oxford: Wiley Blackwell.
Price, David. 2007. Anthropology as lamppost? a comment on the
counterinsurgency field manual. Anthropology Today 23(6):20–21.
Ring, Laura A. 2007. Zenana: everyday peace in a Karachi apartment
building. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Rosenthal, John. 2006. The French path to Jihad: Islamist inmates
tell their story. Policy Review 139. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution,
Stanford University.
Roy, Olivier. 2004. Globalized Islam: the search for a new Ummah.
New York: Columbia University Press.
Sageman, Marc. 2008. Leaderless Jihad: terror networks in the twenty-
first century. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Sahlins, Marshall. 2005. Apologies to Thucydides. Chicago: University
of Chicago Press. [BK]
Said, Edward W. 1978. Orientalism. London: Penguin.
Scheer, Robert. 2002. Bin Laden: a known monster before 9/11.
Nation, September 11, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20020923/
20020910.
Schirmer, Jennifer. 1993. The seeking of truth and the gendering of
consciousness: the COMADRES of El Salvador and the Conavigua
widows of Guatemala. In “Viva”: women and popular protest in
This content downloaded from 129.215.19.193 on Wed, 22 Jan 2014 08:28:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Werbner Anthropological Blues in the Face of Global Terror 221
Latin America. Sarah A. Radcliffe and Sallie Westwood, eds. Lon-
don: Routledge.
Simpson, E., and K. Kresse, eds. 2008. Struggling with history: Islam
and cosmopolitanism in the Western Indian Ocean. New York: Co-
lumbia University Press. [JS]
Soares, Benjamin, and Fillipo Osella, eds. 2009. Islam, politics, an-
thropology. Special issue, Journal of the Royal Anthropological In-
stitute 15(S1). [JS]
Solzhenitsyn, A. 1973. The Gulag Archipelago. New York: Harper &
Row. [JK]
Spencer, Jonathan, ed. 1990. History and the roots of conflict. London:
Routledge.
———. 2000. On not becoming a “terrorist”: problems of memory,
agency and community in the Sri Lankan conflict. In Violence and
subjectivity. Veena Das, Arthur Kleinman, Mamphela Ramphele,
and Pamela Reynolds, eds. Pp. 120–140. New Delhi: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Tambiah, S. J. 1986. Sri Lanka: ethnic fratricide and the dismantling
of democracy. London: Tauris.
———. 1992. Buddhism betrayed? religion, politics and violence in Sri
Lanka. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Tate, Winifred. 2007. Counting the dead: the culture and politics of
human rights activism in Columbia. Berkeley: University of Cali-
fornia Press.
Taussig, Michael. 1999. Defacement: public secrecy and the labor of
the negative. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
———. 2003. Law in a lawless land: diary of a Limpieza in Columbia.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Thomas, George B. 2001. Is an anthropology of international rela-
tions possible? Anthropology News, December.
Trawick, M. 2007. Enemy lines: warfare, childhood and play in Bat-
ticaloa. Berkeley: University of California Press. [JS]
Turner, Victor. 1957. Schism and community in an African community.
Manchester: Manchester University Press.
U.K. Ministry of Defence. 2003. The information campaign. In Op-
erations in Iraq: lessons for the future, chap. 10, http://www.mod
.uk/defenceinternet/home/. [JK]
Valentine, Daniel E. 1996. Charred lullabies: chapters in an anthro-
pology of violence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
van der Veer, Peter. 2004. South Asian Islam in Britain. Ethnicities
4(1):135–146.
———. 2006. Pim Fortuyn, Theo van Gogh, and the politics of
tolerance in the Netherlands. Public Culture 18:111–125. [PV]
van der Veer, Peter, and Shoma Munshi, eds. 2004. Media, war, and
terrorism: responses from the Middle East and Asia. London: Rout-
ledge-Curzon. [PV]
Verkaaik, Oscar. 2004. Migrants and militants: “fun” and urban vi-
olence in Pakistan. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Wallace, Anthony F. C. 1956. Revitalization movements. American
Anthropologist 58:264–281. [RJG]
Werbner, Pnina. 1994. Diaspora and millenium: British Pakistani
local-global fabulations of the Gulf War. In Islam, globalization and
postmodernity. Akbar S. Ahmed and Hastings Donnan, eds. Pp.
213–236. London: Routledge.
———. 1996. Allegories of sacred imperfection: magic, hermeneutics
and passion in The Satanic Verses. In Anthropology in public. Special
issue, Current Anthropology 37(suppl.):S55–S86.
———. 2002a. Imagined diasporas among Manchester Muslims: the
public performance of Pakistani transnational identity politics. World
Anthropology Series. Santa Fe, NM: New School of American
Research.
———. 2002b. Reproducing the multicultural nation. Anthropology
Today 18(2):3–4. [SML]
———. 2003. Pilgrims of love: the anthropology of a global Sufi cult.
Santa Fe, NM: New School of American Research.
———. 2004. The predicament of diaspora and millennial Islam:
reflections on September 11, 2001. Ethnicities 4(4):451–476.
———. 2005a. Islamophobia: incitement to religious hatred—leg-
islating for a new fear? Anthropology Today 21(1):5–9.
———. 2005b. The translocation of culture: migration, community,
and the force of multiculturalism in history. Sociological Review
53(4):745–768.
————. 2007a. Intimate disciples in the modern world: the cre-
ation of translocal amity among South Asian Sufis in Britain. In
Sufism and the “modern” in Islam. Martin van Bruinessen and Julia
Day Howell, eds. Pp. 195–216. London: Tauris.
———. 2007b. Veiled interventions in pure space: shame and em-
bodied struggles among Muslims in Britain and France. In Au-
thority and Islam. Special issue, Theory, Culture and Society 24(2):
161–186.
———. 2009. Revisiting the UK Muslim diasporic public sphere at
a time of terror: from local (benign) invisible spaces to seditious
conspiratorial spaces and national media dialogue. South Asian
Diaspora 1(1):19–45.
Werbner, Richard. 1991. Tears of the dead. Washington, DC: Smith-
sonian Institution.
———. 1995. Human rights and moral knowledge: arguments of
accountability in Zimbabwe. In Shifting contexts: transformations
in anthropological knowledge. Marilyn Strathern, ed. Pp. 99–116.
London: Routledge.
———. 2004. Reasonable radicals and citizenship in Botswana.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
White, Jenny B. 2002. Islamist mobilization in Turkey: a study of
vernacular politics. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Wictorowitcz, Quintan. 2005. Radical Islam rising: Muslim extremism
in the West. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Wikan, Unni. 2008. In honor of Fadime: murder and shame. Rev.
edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Wilson, Richard A. 2001. The politics of truth and reconciliation in
South Africa: legitimizing the post-apartheid state. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
———, ed. 2005. Human rights in the “war on terror.” Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Worsley, Peter. 1957. The trumpet shall sound: a study of “cargo” cults
in Melanesia. London: Macgibbon & Kee. [RJG]
Zaman, Muhammad Qasim. 2002. The Ulama in contemporary Islam.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
This content downloaded from 129.215.19.193 on Wed, 22 Jan 2014 08:28:42 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
